A study of Heidegger's 'The Origin of the Work of Art' by Sys, Raphael
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
A Study of Heidegger's 
The Origin o f the Work of Art
Presented by Raphaël Sys under the supervision o/David Jasper 
- June 2002 -
Submitted in partial fulfilment o f  the requirement for the degree o f  Master o f  Philosophy in the 
Department o f Theology and Religious Studies, University o f Glasgow
- University of Glasgow -
ProQuest Number: 10646846
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uesL
ProQuest 10646846
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Special thanks to David Jasper for his advice and his patience. I 
also wish to thank the Department of Theology and Religious 
studies for help and encouragement during my two years in 
Glasgow.
La redaction de ce mémoire n ’a pas toujours été sans heurt ni 
obstacle ; ils ont parsemé le cours de ma réflexion mais ont 
surtout vu le jour dans les régions plus obscures et moins 
explicables de ce que l’on nomme la vie de tous les jours. Je 
remercie donc ceux qui faisaient partie de ce quotidien, ceux qui 
se sont penchés sur les questions qui ne se trouvent pas toujours 
dans l’encre noire d’une page blanche, ceux qui ont fait naître 
une envie, et ceux qui l’ont fait renaître ensuite.
Meg*
m
Magritte René, Voice o f Space
The present work proposes a phenomenological 
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Introduction
Before commenting upon Heidegger’s work and before witnessing Being 
revealing itself in the light of the origin of the work of art, I will propose, in this 
introduction, to relocate the concept of the work of art in its origin. This will help us to 
understand Heidegger in his philosophical and aesthetic context. Indeed, Heidegger puts 
a great emphasis on the idea of tradition which comes to a breakpoint with the timeless 
truth of Being. Is Heidegger’s philosophy situated within a traditional path and, if so, 
how does it come to subvert it?
As far as aesthetics is concerned, it is by far the idea of perception which stands 
at the climax of this philosophical reflection. We commonly agree on the fact that we 
come across the external world, that we encounter it according to sensible rules which 
allow us to speak about aesthetic judgement. The evolution of aesthetic reflection needs 
to be apprehended through the span that distinguishes between Kant’s conception of 
subjectivity and hermeneutic phenomenology as it circles in Heidegger’s works. It is in 
fact the distance between the perceiving eye and the perceived object which animated 
the philosophical discourse evolving from an absolute subjectivity to a dynamic 
intersubjectivity. By this I mean that in Heidegger’s philosophy, aesthetic philosophy 
has come to a point in which the manifestation of the work of art and its welcoming by 
the perceiving eye both merge. This path constitutes the world and the horizon of 
Heidegger’s ^"hermeneutic circie’\  and we will see how this circle relocates this 
historical evolution within a larger frame, a frame comprehending the work of art and 
the perceiving subject, a frame described as Being standing within its own original light. 
It is yet difficult to speak about artistic creation without referring to the principle of 
perception which always is a creating act. Here perception means ""reception'^ and it 
conveys the idea of the world that we agree upon being given to our senses. The concept 
implies that nothing can be created sui generis but always has biographical, historical,
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or political circumstances. Art is first of all a human matter and we shall see with Hegel, 
it is the most immanent human expression that shows forth the divine. For a long time, 
this human dimension has been read through the lines of classical onto-theology. We 
will try to re-discover the authentic existential essence: Dasein as it is conjured by 
Being. There is therefore a double constraint as far as reception of the work of art is 
concerned, the one being a response to an expression described as human and the one 
being a response to Being in its radical alterity.
The origin of the work of art is strongly attached to the notion of judgement as it 
was conceived in the age of Enlightenment. As Gadamer says in Warheit und Methode, 
“the word judgement was introduced in the eighteenth century in order to convey the 
concept of judicium (...). In the same way, the English moral philosophers emphasise 
that moral and aesthetic judgement do not obey reason, but have the character of 
sentiment (or taste)”. This corresponds to what Burke calls ""wisdom without 
reflectiorF^. We see how politics, ethics and aesthetics all converge around the idea of 
representation. Kant will say that the beautiful pleases universally and without a concept. 
The origin of the work of art is then related to the conditions of possibility of the 
enunciation of aesthetic judgement... and therefore of “taste”. Kant clearly underlines 
the links keeping together the particular and the universal, and he revisits this question 
through the notion of encounter between the two. As Alexis Philonenko says, ”la 
métaphysique classique séparant l ’universel et le particulier, transforme l ’individualité 
en réalité incompréhensible. Le génie de Kant lui montre que nier la possibilité d ’un 
rapport entre le particulier et l ’universalité revient à nier la communication: car c ’est
 ^Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, [1790], Conor Omise O'Brien, éd., Pelican Classics, 
1973
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toujours “cet” homme qui rencontre “cet” autre homme et qui communique avec lui. 
Philonenko then points out that Kant aims at “elaborating a logic in which the universal 
and the particular join within an aesthetic communication” (translation mine). The 
Kantian aesthetic will then aim at solving the problem of individual interconnections 
within the link of the singular and the universal. Aesthetic therefore becomes the 
appropriate climate where a human community can take place.
Let’s have a closer look at Kant’s aesthetic judgement as it appears in his philosophy of 
taste. The judgement of taste is first unapproachable through concepts since there is no 
empirical reason that can impose a judgement of taste to somebody (§ 33). Since there is 
no objective principle of the taste, it is therefore the subjective principle of the faculty of 
judgement which operates this function. Yet Kant sees these principles as a “sensus 
commnunis ” (§ 40) defined as such : “ sous cette expression de sensus communis, on 
doit comprendre Vidée d ’un sens commun à tous, c ’est à dire une faculté de juger, qui 
dans sa réflexion, tient compte en pensant du mode de représentation de tout autre 
homme, afin de rattacher pour ainsi dire son jugement à la raison humaine toute 
entière et échapper ce faisant à l ’illusion résultant des conditions subjectives et 
particulières pouvant aisément être tenues pour objectives ” (§ 40).
Two aspects have been mentioned: the point of coherence which gathers 
singularities and the “common sense” linking the three critics within the “teleological 
faculty of judgement”. The question of telos means to set up temporality in the emerging 
and more particularly the epiphany of the work of art. Hegel will put together Art and 
Religion because both are a path towards the spirit, that is to say Being in itself and for 
itself. Art is in fact the first moment of the mind which tells the truth as truth itself; in
Alexis Philonenko, introduction à Emmanuel Kant, Critique de la faculté de juger, Vriii, 1986, p. 12
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that sense, Art is Religion. As it is stated in The Aesthetics^ I, 29: "la plus haute 
destination de VArt est celle qui lui est commune avec la religion et la philosophie”. It 
is a divine mode of expression. Its role will be to give elevated ideas a sensible mode of 
expression: "la pensée pénètre dans les profondeurs d ’un monde supra-sensible q u ’elle 
oppose à un au-delà à la conscience immédiate et à la sensation directe”. Artistic 
activity therefore becomes a mediation between nature and finite reality on the one hand 
and infinite liberty of comprehensive thought on the other.
It was important for us to refer to Kanf s teleology and to Hegel’s vision of art as 
moments of the Mind and as modes of expression of the divine in order to understand 
better Heidegger’s aesthetic thinking. We should yet take a slight detour along the 
romantic stream in order to solidify this approach.
The romantic movement (at least in its early stages) was deeply influenced by the 
principles of empiricism. I would like to quote here the summary of these principles 
given by Finney in his book on Keats : "The fundamental principle o f  empiricism is the 
principle that there are no innate ideas, that ideas are copies o f the impressions made 
by external objects on the senses. The second principle is the principle that complex 
ideas, or intellectual ideas, develop out o f simple ideas, or sensations, by the process o f  
association. A third principle is the principle that the feelings o f pleasure and pain are 
the springs o f  action. And a fourth principle is the principle that the mind acts from a 
mechanical or physical necessity, on which it has no control. There was a diversity o f  
opinion among the empirical philosophers in regard to the secondary principles o f  
empiricism. Materialists held that impulses o f  the mind, which govern action, are 
egotistic or selfish; and humanitarians held that impulses o f  the mind, when pure and
12
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uncontaminated, are disinterested or benevolent"^. Wordsworth accepted the 
fundamental principles of empiricism, and he constantly stressed the fact that sensations, 
the simple ideas out of which complex ideas, such as moral and religious ideas, evolve 
through the process of association. From this he logically deduced that the nature of a 
man's sensations determines the character of his higher ideas, that is to say that 
sensations produced by beautiful and pure objects cause pure and beautiful ideas. This 
indeed is the philosophy of Tintem Abbey which we have just evoked, and also that of 
the Ode on the Intimations o f Immortality. From this it might be inferred that the basic 
principles of Romanticism were of a mechanistic nature; yet, such was not the case: 
Wordsworth and Coleridge for instance rejected the Lockean conception of wit as 
merely a pleasant combination of ideas : associationism and sensationism were so to 
speak "corrected" or tempered by a rather thorough idealism, or, as Finney aptly puts if 
"upon the empirical bases o f  sensationism and associationism, Wordsworth imposed a 
principle o f mystical insight which was neoplatonic in origin"^. On this twofold basis 
was to be derived the philosophy of romantic imagination.
The romantics rejected the extreme form of sensationism (that is to say 
perception limited to physical objects only) and idealistically restored the idea of the 
supremacy of the spirit, mind being the central point and governing factor. They thus 
did not stop at a mechanistic conception of the world but introduced or re-introduced a 
philosophy of value : they were convinced that there is an order of things beyond what is 
perceived or known; or, as Bowra puts it : "they were convinced that, though visible 
things are the instruments by which we find  this reality, they are not everything and 
have indeed little significance unless they are related to some embracing and sustaining
 ^Finney Claude, The Evolution o f  Keats's Poetry, New York, Russell & Russell, \96A,pp.239-240 
M à.,p.240
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power"\ To put it in other words, they were convinced that the imaginative principle 
can "see into the life of things" as Wordsworth said in Tintem Abbey : insight goes 
beyond mere sight; imagination then is the most vital activity of the mind, and through it 
man partakes of the activity of God. Blake said of imagination: "I know that this world 
is a world o f  imagination and vision. This world is all One continued vision o f  Fancy or 
Imagination". Imagination is then power and to some extent it governs the external 
world; this is what Coleridge said of imagination : it is, he says, in Dejection, an Ode, 
that which gives shape to life; nature lives only in us, and this faculty fashions reality 
from a shapeless, undifferentiated given.
We have seen with Kant that the true finality of the work of art is to recapture the 
whole of sensible diversity within a universal and supra-sensible idea. There dwells the 
essence of the artwork which escapes from its own wooden frame and recaptures itself 
within that which it casts into light, that is to say the whole of existence. In that sense the 
work of art remains a mystery to itself, it withdraws before its opening and it is this 
double movement which urges us to wonder about the isness of that thing which ceases 
to be itself when it reaches the climax of its signification.
Thinking the work of art first means to make visible that it is not given within 
the aggregate of its immediate constituting elements. It is within its intention that the 
work of art is fully alive. It is not in its physical reality that the work of art is present to 
us, it is not through its sensible appearance that it leaves us wordless but, on the 
contrary, it is its capacity to become the meaningful horizon of its own pictural 
representation.
This is a phrase of Franck Bowra, Romantic Imagination.
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We can already distinguish three different aspects of the problem:
1. the meaningful horizon of the work of art is diluted among cultural imperatives 
that enable us to call a work a “work of art”
2. the work is “monumental”
3. the artwork relevance is related to the presence of an authority
The artwork’s horizon is diluted within an inter-text that has to be understood from a 
pragmatic point of view. Let’s take the example of a painting. Before focusing on and 
contemplating a work of art, we already have in mind whether it will be produced in a 
temporary or a continuous exhibition, in a gallery or a museum. The political exigencies 
or expectations of a country might as well play a role as to whether such or such artist’s 
work will be exposed. The concept of “art” is therefore shaped by the imposition of a 
cultural fashion. Now, if we get closer to the painting, a whole world of signification 
enables us to recognize it as such. Only behind these previous cultural filters does the 
artwork become a Paul Klee, a Monet, a Picasso or a Miro. They all bear the seal of an 
individual signature. We are now looking at the work of art itself as it shows itself. And 
yet, the work of art itself is a ""tracV and it projects us back within a cultural horizon in 
which it was bom. It locates itself within a canon gathering at the same time artistic, 
political and religious features. These three categories constitute what we culturally call 
culture. They give an angle to our sight, determine our comprehension, stand as a guide 
showing us the way to a work of art. let’s take the example of a city. Its architecture is 
made of “traces” and monuments as they were thought at the time: Paris was modelled 
by Hausmann, London was reconfigured after the great fire of 1666; some monuments 
are preserved, others are destroyed, and some others are rebuilt in the same identical
15
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way. Any city corresponds to the mode of thinking of a civilisation. Something 
absolutely original is utterly unthinkable since it would not even be recognised. Nothing 
could exist without a cultural background imposing its criteria and constituting the 
invisible glasses that help us to see and to understand what we see. In these conditions, 
the work of art never belongs to us, it always stands within a transcendental entity that 
we name “culture”.
In the light of these considerations, we can now contemplate the inter-subjective 
question that is implied in the notion of work of art. We yet need to couple it to the other 
key notion of our dissertation, I mean the origin of the work of art. We will shape our 
reflection around two singularities; the “subject” who receives the work of art and the 
meaningful horizon embodied by such or such work.
So far, we have seen that the work of art stands in the politico-theological 
complexity of its signification. If we now refer to a singular individual looking at the 
work’s singularities, we first notice that the work of art is in progress. The work of art 
takes its origin in Time and it lets itself be captured through time; indeed it takes time 
for the work to be in progress, or to be perceived as being in progress. It is both there 
and not yet there. It is because it is there without being fully there that one visits it, one 
comes back to it, that intimate links keep us attached to it. The ""theré^ of the work of art 
therefore tends to shrink and to yield ground to the intimacy of a moment when it 
becomes alive through my body. As Bakhtin says it stands as a “chronotopic” mirror of 
my being. Hermeneutics then becomes a reading of myself through myself; I become a 
work of art, I am made of works of art, texts, monuments, of what Dilthey called “the 
documents of life”. The “there” of the work of art becomes my own space. A space of 
experience, a space without a distance since “I” can only be read through texts and
16
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documents. My own identity is a canvas of artworks which is designed according to my 
education, my political environment, my religion. “I” is made of the other.
If I am the fruit of these documents, I need to know what is the specific place of 
the work of art among these documents. From a reflective point of view, there is a 
progressive passage from the documents to the work of art, regardless of the canon’s 
authority that determines the legitimacy of the artistic object. Any document is the 
product of an activity, a labour; whether it is a philosophical system, a sculpture, a 
political constitution, we are dealing here with cultural objects which stand as the most 
appropriate expression of human nature. The work of art detaches from these cultural 
objects which are all “works”. To Kant’s mind, it is the spot for ""genius” as it is distinct 
to ""craft” (The Critique o f Judgement, §48). What Kant calls genius is that which 
provides rules to art. Shelley will side with that point of view when, in the preface of 
Prometheus Unbound, he speaks of poets as the ""unacknowledged legislators” of 
humanity. For Kant, it is an innate faculty, an expression of nature, the expression of the 
artist. Bearing this remark in mind, we will then conclude that a work of art is
recognised as such when it sets up rules, a linguistic code. Yet, the rules find their
sources in the artistic autonomy of their expressions. By this I mean that they overtake 
any kind of canonisation and give themselves their own rules.
As in Hegel’s philosophy, the work in progress reveals itself under the form of a
double movement. It drags us towards the centre of its representation where it
withdraws itself and then diffuses itself into the world that it encloses. Artistic products 
correspond to Being’s revelation which unfolds in its expressions. The artistic document 
offers itself to my perceptive attention. It is a path to Being and represents the essence of 
its manifestation. In that sense, the work of art comes into progress and reveals itself in 
that intention which, contrary to the other documents, does not belong to the field of
17
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""utensility”. This intention is nothing more than the movement from the work towards 
itself, searching for the “authentic” light of its origin.
The work of art detaches from these documents of our culture and expands until 
it becomes the horizon within which this culture finds its signification. It becomes the 
receptacle giving a colour and a name to Being now conjuring me. A space of time is 
drawn within a frame that circumscribes the authentic sphere. The work of art pursues 
the question of becoming itself, of replacing itself within the frame of its essential 
sphere, and it is in the light of this movement that it sets itself into question.
This question is the appropriate moment, the kairos, for the work of art to let 
forth its “thereness” and to open itself to our discourse. It is fully present within the 
existential distance that is comprised within the essential revelation that it becomes 
itself.
The work of art opens the field of hermeneutics that comes to reveal its 
signification along the path from the artwork to the work of art, from the self to the self, 
from being to Being. So much for this introduction, lef s now follow Heidegger’s texts 
which we will carefully read step by step. Indeed, Heidegger needs a close reading, a 
meticulous analysis, and for that reason, we will exclusively remain on the path of his 
own philosophy.
18

The There of the Question
The There of the Question
i .  The Question o f  Being
In Sein und Zeit 4^, Heidegger introduces us to the question o f Being:
«The very fa c t  that we already live in an understanding o f  Being and  
that the meaning o f  Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is 
necessary in principle to raise this question again».
Indeed, we understand with this quotation that Heidegger’s work is 
devoted to the concept o f fundam ental ontology: what is Being, what does it 
mean to be, what does it mean to ask the question o f being, perceived in its 
sense of being. A question is already a response to a problem (that is to say 
the setting into question of an aporia) which opens its problematic 
complexity in the scope of the interrogation mark. Sein und Zeit is a book 
w ithout an end and it therefore does not provide a definite answer to the 
issue raised in the introductory chapters: the question of the sense o f being.
 ^Heidegger Martin, Being and Time, Ed. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1962). Sein und Zeit will either be fully written or referred to as "SZ" followed by the paragraph 
number.
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But a definite answer is not the prim ary object of our question. Sein und Zeit 
is above all about the question  of being seen as our first step into a 
phenomenological approach to ontology. To ask a question does not only
mean to add an interrogation mark at the end of a sentence. Rather, it
signifies the recognition of a problem and taking into account the obstacles 
obstructing the way towards a possible answer. To ask the question of being 
therefore means to drag it out of its obviousness; it means to put into words 
that which usually goes w ithout saying and consequently sinks into oblivion. 
In other words, the prim ary task is to acknowledge the fact that the
phenom ena are not always apparent, that they do not always stand in the 
light of their presence, and that the path towards the things are not
automatically open. The phenomenological method can get lost, it can fail, 
and its prim ary endeavour will be to free the way and to free the things on 
the way so that nothing will rem ain forgotten. For that matter. Sein und Zeit 
is mainly about the elaboration o f a starting point which is solid enough to 
support the whole of the things in question.
The question asks about the sense of being. It is directed towards all 
that is, as in « there is » (es gibt). It hence invites us to ask the question 
about itself (the question) which is also something that is. It is the object of 
its own considerations and, in that respect, it has to be consciously part and 
parcel of that which it researches for its possible answer to be satisfying. To 
think Being first means to think Being in its totality, in its entirety, so that 
our ontological research plays on a fundamental ground and not on a regional 
apparatus. Thus, to think Being first means to think the conditions of 
possibilities of an understanding o f Being, to think the «possible horizon fo r
21
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any understanding whatsoever o f  Being» (SZ § 1). In m athematical terms, we 
need to determ ine the conditions of possibilities of the set o f all sets 
including itself. The question o f the sense of being therefore appears as a 
preparation of an ontological ground; it is the first effort of orientation on a 
path of which it is the own entrance. Sein und Zeit is a travel along the path 
of thinking down to the question of being which had been so far forgotten.
If Being has been forgotten, it is for two apparent reasons: the first 
one, Heidegger notes it at once, dwells in the concealed nature of Being. 
Being is that which we all commonly understand and yet do not know how to 
define because it does not give itself as an em pirical phenomenon would; as 
it is stated in Sein und Zeit, « Being is that which does not have a gender but 
covers the entirety o f  what is in its most general form  » (SZ 3). Being cannot 
be located within an empirical manifestation inasmuch as it is nowhere and 
everywhere at the same time, as it is pre-supposed in the existing whole 
standing in the horizon o f my sight and of my consciousness; it dwells in all 
that call upon my senses, my conscience, it dwells in my conscience itself, in 
the words being written, in brief, it is in all that we philosophically call a 
thing, that is to say the Heideggerian entity. The second reason for B eing’s 
falling into oblivion can be seen as a consequence of the first one; not 
knowing how to locate it -s in ce  it does not appear as such - the path to 
follow for a phenom enological inquiry also remains obscure and therefore 
out of reach. In that sense, Heidegger’s method developed in Sein und Zeit 
could be legitimately reduced to an education of our sight: we need to learn 
how to see in order first to cast into light the path that will secondly lead us 
to Being then perceived as a phenomenon. In that sense, Sein und Z e it’s
22
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contribution is priceless. It first teaches us to see and to understand where to 
start, where to go; and second it teaches us how to turn Being into a 
perceptible phenomenon that we can now describe, since it is there before 
our eyes (what only announced itself now shows itself) as the object of our 
question. The very problem related to the difficulty to perceive Being, or at 
least the recognition of that problem, asks the question of perception itself; 
under what modes am I likely to perceive that which is before my eyes? How 
does it come that as far as Being is concerned, my piercing gaze ceases to 
be piercing and does not even manage to know what it should pierce 
through? The answer to that question may not only dwell in my deficient 
eyes but may well lie in the how, the why and the when a phenomenon like 
Being gives itself.
What is a phenomenon? Do all the phenom ena belong to the same 
genre? W hat does it mean for a phenomenon to give or not to give itself 
w ithin my question? Setting a problem, through the setting-into-question of 
that problem is already a m aking manifest of the problem which no longer 
sinks into oblivion. If  Sein und Zeit does not ultim ately provide us with the 
answer about the sense o f Being, at least its m erit is to ask the question and 
to conduct philosophy in a direction that can no longer be ignored. W hat we 
should retain from Sein und Zeit, is that the destination is not more 
im portant than the direction. If  Being stands concealed behind or at the core 
of all things, knowing that a chance to find it is to look behind is therefore 
already knowing it well enough to guess and foresee where it is likely to 
withdraw.
23
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After all, the prim ary contact established with the problem is 
undoubtedly the question about it and if it cannot entirely satisfy our request 
it can at least tell us where to turn our eyes. These considerations need to be 
well considered. In a very simple way, they relocate the existential analytic 
in the perspective of fundam ental ontology (what it tends towards) and 
consequently annihilate the eight-year-distance that separates The Origin o f  
the Work o f  A rt from Sein und Zeit. The one cannot be read without the 
other. If The Origin o f  the Work o f  A rt is even more about ontology than Sein 
und Zeit, it is certainly because in 1935, Heidegger had a clearer view of 
Being as a given phenomenon. The Origin o f  the Work o f  A rt could be seen 
as the accomplishment of phenomenology, that is to say the moment when a 
non-apparent phenomenon turns into an apparent one and therefore offers 
itself to the method which managed to replace it within an empirical frame. 
Phenomenology lets the phenomenon offer itself, and it is by offering itself 
or m anifesting itself that it presents itself before our eyes.
Sein und Z e it’s novelty lay in the idea that a phenomenologically 
reconstituted phenomenon rem ains what is not im mediately present through 
an empirical form but is only mediately announced and consequently guessed 
at. In that sense, a phenomenologically reconstituted phenomenon is 
different from a phenomenon which stands there in front of our eyes in its 
empirical, « o n tica b f, m anifestation. Phenomenology stands as a "digging" 
enterprise going always deeper down into the layers o f the presupposed and
 ^To be here or there in an empirical foim
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the pre-understood until the moment when the ultimate and originary point 
of our research is gathered within our understanding and comprehensive 
conscience. The Origin o f  the Work o f  A rt deals with the phenomenality of 
Being as a phenom enologically reconstituted phenomenon, a concept which 
is commonly accepted as ontology. In that sense. The Origin o f  the Work o f  
A rt puts a final point to Sein und Zeit, but if it acts as such it is only by re­
travelling along the path o f phenomenology previously opened in 1927.
2, The Question o f  Origin
The Origin o f  the Work o f  A rt is in no way a philosophy about art, but 
is exclusively about Being. In the first paragraph, Heidegger asks the 
question of the origin of the work of art and faces the difficulty to find a 
starting point for a possible inquiry about it. For that matter, what triggers 
Heidegger's reflection lies in that difficulty itself, as difficulty, which is the 
first step towards a further possible answer. The recognition of the difficulty 
consists in the setting into question of the «equiprimordiaîity»  (SZ 84) 
between the work of art and the artist. Indeed, the artist can be granted the 
denomination artist thanks to what he produces, that is to say the work of art 
which, in turn, owes its value to the artist:
«The artist is the origin o f  the work. The work is the origin o f  the
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artist. Neither is without the other.
Heidegger starts by asking the question of the artist, then moves on to the 
artwork in order to recognise the equiprimordiaîity  between artist and 
artwork so that it is in art that we need to pursue our philosophical 
reflection. The origin of the work of art is now to be found in the essence of 
the work of art. The question becomes: what is the essence of the work of 
art? Already, we perceive how we have to deal with an ontological question 
applied to an ontical phenomenon, the work of art :
«Whatever the decision may be, the question o f  the origin o f  the work o f
art becomes a question about the essence o f  art.y f
The method is here existentialist. Heidegger reminds us that our 
reflection has to be guided by that which is there before our eyes; he does 
not aim at establishing a metaphysical reconstruction about the question of 
art, but makes it clear that art is art only because it can be witnessed in a 
work of art:
«Can art be an origin? Where and how does art occur? A rt -this is 
nothing more than a word to which nothing actual any longer 
corresponds.»^^
® Heidegger Martin, «The Origin o f the Work of Art», in Basic Writings, Revised and expanded edition. 
Ed. David Farrell Krell (Routledge: London, 1993) p. 143.
^Ibid.,p.l44.
Ibid.,p.l43.
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«Since the question whether and how art in general exists must still 
remain open, we shall attempt to discover the essence o f  art in the 
place where art undoubtedly prevails in an actual way.»^^
It therefore goes w ithout saying that our research will follow art in its 
way of setting itself into work, that is to say in «the artwork». In Sein und  
Zeit, Heidegger puts us into contact with Being by interrogating that in 
which it sets itself into presence, that in which it «announces»  itself. Indeed, 
in SZ 42, it is said that «the essence o f  Dasein holds in its existence». With
Heidegger, we will see it later on, the concept o f essence is understood in
terms of projection into movement, as an activity which takes its form in the 
empirical trace of its existential reality. As for art, it is through the setting- 
into-work that we can hope to perceive a setting-into-question of that which 
opens itself to my gaze, that is to say art in the work o f art. Because the
work of art is there before my eyes, I can direct my question towards the
«what» and the «how» a work of art is. The work of art is present before my 
eyes as an artistic «there» which I perceive as a given presence prompting 
my concern.
W hat has ju st been said already suggests many different im plications 
which should be pointed out in order for us to understand, later on, what it 
means to see, to perceive, to understand a work of art as it is before my eyes. 
From the previous references to the text The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, it 
already appears that Heidegger does not propose a cognitive theory based on 
the supremacy of the judgem ent by which we come to know that which is
Ibid., pp.143-144
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empirically there. We do not adopt a demonstrative approach but rather, a 
descriptive one. To question the essence of art first means to question the 
artwork, to interrogate its what and its how, that is to say its way of being 
present to me, its way of being there as a presence to which I can respond by 
interrogating its mode of donation, that is its mode of giving itself as and in 
a «there». 1 can only consider that which is before me and nothing exists for 
me without my eyes to see. It is quite manifest that any cognitive theory 
takes its source in a point of contact in which the thing opens within the 
light of my question and in which my question finds its own condition of 
possibility. In other words, Heidegger does not conceive the possibility of a 
unilateral relationship to the external world.
Phenomenology thus parts both from Realism and Idealism; in the former 
instance, the philosophers aimed at a knowledge leaving the subjective 
sphere constituted by our senses, and in the latter instance, they aimed at the 
constitution of an objective knowledge without leaving the subjective sphere. 
In phenomenology, a thing is always present to my eyes within a space of 
interrogation that I myself determine through the field of my considerations. 
To see something hence means to find a point of encounter between my 
seeing  the phenomenon and the giving  of the same phenomenon. If 
Heidegger first emphasises the essence of art, it is exclusively because his 
intention is to find the right angle to begin with; an angle where there is a 
chance that the object might give itself within the scope of the question. I 
position the object in front of me so that the aspect it presents to me allows 
me an entrée en matière, that is to say a localisation of the aporia and an 
understanding of it. In that respect, my question is always and already
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directed in a way that I evaluate as appropriate for the opening of a field of 
investigation.
Yet, my question was not born out of the blue; it is in no way a cause in 
itself. It is in effect not only actualised by my expressed concern, but it is 
also provoked and stimulated by the presence of the object itself which, by 
being there, enables the question: what is it doing there? The possibility for 
me to have a knowledge about something before my eyes seems, at first 
sight, to rely on the contact between myself and that something. Heidegger 
begins his investigation about the origin of the work of art at this very point. 
Art is not a visible phenomenon and only an analysis through the work of art 
will perhaps allow us to enter into contact with art itself. In the most simple 
terms, Heidegger proposes to ask the question of the work of art by 
considering it as an «entity» that we have before our eyes and that gives 
itself as a visible phenomenon. To respond to the presence of the 
phenomenon by asking the question of its very presence is in itself a 
phenomenological approach through which we might hope to pierce through 
the empirical envelope that keeps us away from the «thing in itself», that is 
the essence that lies in the existence of the thing and that makes it such. 
Already, any entity seems to be constituted by a twofold phenomenal reality. 
We find ourselves either in presence of a phenomenology of the apparent 
(when we deal with the work of art as a painting that is there inside a frame) 
or a phenomenology of the non-apparent ( when we ask the question of the 
essence of the work of art).
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3, The Question o f  the Phenomenon
These introductory considerations certainly draw our attention to the 
definition of the phenomenon itself. We perceive what gives itself through 
its mode of donation, that is to say its way of giving itself to our eyes in our 
most daily acts. In Sein und Zeit, a phenomenon is defined as an entity the 
mode of being of which is to «show itself» (SZ 29). It refers to the Greek 
(paivecxTai commonly understood as the reflexive form of (paivo), that 
wherein som ething can become manifest. We are therefore interested in the 
what and the how  of that which «shows itse lf in itself». As opposed to 
Husserl’s "Cartesian" view on the subject, the phenomenon in Heidegger’s 
phenomenology is never reduced to the object of doubt. There is no such 
thing as a phenomenological reduction (that is to say reduction of the 
empirical reality to doubt) in Heidegger’s philosophy; the empirical world 
present before my eyes is never put between brackets for the simple reason 
that its reality is never questioned. It is yet pierced through by our 
phenomenological eyes but never constitutes the object of doubt. There is 
therefore no going beyond the phenomenon for Heidegger and similarly, 
phenomenological reduction can no longer be the means to be used for a 
reflection on the modes of being of the self. The phenomenon, in its being 
there in front of me, can well take the form of a «symptom», or deceive our 
senses by the means of a deceitful appearance, but its being there howsoever 
remains that towards which my gaze is turned. Heidegger enlarges the 
perceptible field of phenomena to that which shows itself as a not showing
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itse lf  or as «something which it is not» (SZ 29). We now find ourselves in 
presence of three different types of phenomena:
1. The (paiveoTai understood as an auto-manifestation, a revelation of 
the thing in itself.
2. The Scheinen  signifying «semblance», «looking like», illusion.
3. The Erscheinung, that is the announcement within the (pa ivsara i, 
non-apparition, a showing itself in the mode of withdrawing which is 
in fact a non-showing.
That which only announces itself can only be guessed within and through 
the empirical shape of the (paivearai, either as a looking like or as a 
withdrawal. The phenomenon, for example the phenomenon of the work of 
art, is here described as a whole according to its mode of donation. A work 
of art, by showing itself as such, shows what does not appear but only 
announces itself. Art as the essence of any work of art therefore stands as a 
phenomenon showing itself as a non-showing itself, as that which withdraws 
itself and lies in the «deep heart's  core of»^^ the artwork. Phenomenology is 
a method describing the phenomenon as it is in itself, so that it can be 
respected in its mode of donation. In Heidegger’s mind, the phenomenon can 
never be the object of doubt but it can be misunderstood if it is not 
grasped as it gives itself.
Phenomenology describes in order to see better, to perceive better, that is 
to say to "see through" according to principles which are not dictated by our
This is a phrase of S.T. Coleridge
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subjective sphere but which emanate from the thing itself: «to the things 
themselves» (SZ 34) so that the Being of the thing can be reached through 
the thing itself:
«it is som ething that proxim ally and fo r  the most p a rt does not show itse lf 
at all: it is som ething that lies hidden, in contrast to that which 
proxim ally and fo r  the most p art does show itself; but at the same time it 
is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so 
essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground»  (SZ 35).
Phenomenology stands as a way of approaching the phenomena and 
especially a way of approaching that which shows itself as a non-showing. In 
that sense, our method is a making manifest, an act of  casting into light that 
which remains hidden or shows itself in disguise. It proceeds to a passage 
from the apparent to the non-apparent. To see what does not show itself 
(because its mode of being stands either in the disguise or in the hiding) 
means to perceive, phenomenologically speaking, its essential mode of 
being, constituting its meaning and its ground, as a non-showing. A 
phenomenological phenomenon differs from a phenomenon as (paivecTTat in 
the sense that it is phenomenologically looked at, that is to say pierced 
through, and implies a passage from the apparent to the non-apparent so that, 
as non-apparent, it is cast into light, made manifest and therefore apparent as 
a non-apparent.
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A phenomenology of the non-apparent applied to the work of art comes 
back to the question of the essence of the work of art. What is the essence of 
the work of art? We have already shown the ontological consequences of 
such a question, but through the phenomenological analysis of the 
phenomenon as m eaning and ground  o f  the thing in itself, it appears to be 
even more transparent that the only phenomenological phenomenon we are 
re-searching is the Being of the entity. In that respect, ontology and 
phenomenology come to a perfect alliance. I would even push it as far as to 
say that ontology is only possible as phenomenology. Consequently, the 
importance of The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art stands in the importance of its 
phenomenological approach.
In the essay, the artwork is understood as a phenomenon the mode of 
donation of which has to be found in its empirical «there». Through this 
mode of donation, the phenomenon appears to us as «that from  which and by 
which something is what it is and how it is». The path of thinking that is 
developed here makes manifest the passage from a phenomenology of the 
apparent to a phenomenology of the non-apparent. We are not telling a story 
(SZ 6), we are in fact dealing with what goes without saying, the 
«Selbstverstandlichkeit»  (SZ 5), that which is always and already there 
before our eyes which, being our only and constant point of reference, 
forgets that it is still a point of reference implying a specific mode of 
perception and a mode of donation. Phenomenology functions as a «wanting- 
to-have-'a-conscience» of what goes without saying because it is 
selbstverstehen. It works as a highlighting of what we always and already do
33
The There o f the Question
in our everydayness and that we will keep doing as long as we exist, that is, 
to see with our eyes. In The Origin o f  the Work o f  A rt the method consists in 
learning how to see in a phenomenological way that will "open the doors" to 
the object, or to be more accurate, that will let the object open its own 
phenomenal doors. Through the contemplation of the work of art, Heidegger 
reproduces what could be called an aporetic space in which Dasein witnesses 
itself in the phenomenological process of being in contact with a given 
phenomenon, that is to say the world of the work of art. To be in contact 
signifies that I contemplate the «there» of the contact in which the 
phenomenon is allowed to be given because it is contemplated and in which I 
am allowed to perceive because I can perceive something. To think in these 
terms does not yet enable us to define an elaborated concept of the work of 
art; still, the work of art, being an artistic or not artistic phenomenon, 
expresses itself as any other phenomenon, that is to say as an entity within 
the world. A phenomenology of the non-apparent will make us take into 
account the artistic essence of the artwork, precisely that which is «at work  
in the work», that is to say at work in the ontical reality of the wooden 
frame. Unveiling the work of art as such therefore first consists in defining 
the conditions of possibility for an artistic representation to be; in other 
words, we first have to establish the there of the thing in order to visualise 
the there of the work.
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4. The Thing in the Work
«In order to discover the essence of the art that actually prevails in the work, let 
us go to the actual work and ask the work what and how it is>A^ .
The setting-into-question of the what and the how  turns out to be our 
primary contact with the work of art. By being empirically there before my 
eyes, that which is there gives itself within the space of donation which it 
occupies. It is only in that space of donation that I can even conceive to see 
the phenomenon. Outside of it, I find myself in a different space inhabited 
by another entity and outside of it, the «there» of my work of art switches 
off and the work of art itself falls back into the empirical oblivion of my 
non-concern. It (the work of art) is yet at the disposition of my eyes that can 
turn towards it any time they choose to be in contact with it. Even though the 
work of art is not commonly perceived as a thing among so many others 
(indeed, it is granted the distinctive sign of being individually exposed to the 
sight of the spectator) one of its modes of donation expresses itself as being 
ontically there in the midst of  our environment. In that respect, the work of 
art is but a thing, a work of art that has been devitalised, deprived of its 
artistic reality:
« I f we consider the works in their untouched actuality and do not deceive 
ourselves, the result is that the works are as naturally present as are
Heidegger Martin, “The Origin o f the Work o f Ait”, Basic Writings, edited by David Farrell Krell, 
(London, Routledge, 1993) p. 144.
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things. The picture hangs on the wall like a rifle or a hat»^" .^
The «thingly element» of the work of art hangs on the wall as the 
condition of possibility for the work of art to be hung. Art as the essence of 
the work of art cannot be hung on its own; it needs a support, a setting-into- 
matter, a «setting-into-work»  so that it can be seen:
«The thingly element is so irremovably present in the artwork that we are 
com pelled rather to say conversely that the architectural work is in the 
stone, the carving is in wood, the painting in colour, the linguistic work 
in speech, the musical composition in sound»^\
The thing is always present around us, either as a thing or as something 
which is more and yet always a thing. The thing stands as the most basic 
constitutive element of any entity about which we always unconsciously 
presuppose that it will happen in a thingly there. If  a man is reduced to a 
thingly state, or in other words, when a man is treated like a thing, it is not a 
matter of recognising and telling how he is a thing, but, rather, it is a matter 
of not telling that which makes a man of him:
«It is true that we speak o f  a young girl who is fa c ed  with a task too 
difficult fo r  her as being a young thing, s till too young fo r  it, but only 
because we fe e l that being human is in a certain way missing here and
ibid., p. 145.
Ibid., p. 145.
36
The There of the Question
think that instead we have to do here with the fa c to r  that constitutes the 
thingly character o f  things»^^.
Because our conception of the thing is «self-evident», because it goes 
without saying, we can only describe it as that which it is not. For a man to 
be called a thing comes back to depriving him of all the elements which 
characterise him as a man. It therefore becomes a generic designation 
expressed under a negative form. A work of art never gives itself as a thing 
because it is always something else which itself presupposes a ground it can 
rest on;
«it seems alm ost as though the thingly element in the artwork is like the 
substructure into and upon which the other, proper elem ent is built»^^.
5. This Things the Work o f  A rt
The interrogation of the what and the how  of the work of art already casts 
into light two different modes of donation of its own. We can either perceive 
it as a thing or as a work, although that which we contemplate in the work of 
art is the unity in the work. We now know that through a work of art, we are 
in presence of two non-apparent phenomena, art and thing, which only 
announce themselves within the work of art. The thing in the work as well as
Ibid.,p.l47
Ibid.,p.l45
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the art in the work are not empirically present before our eyes. I cannot say 
that there is some art in that corner right beside that blue thingly element. A 
work of art being taken as a whole, these two elements are everywhere and 
nowhere at the same time. In that sense, these are phenomena which do not 
give themselves but either hide, withdraw or disguise themselves. We are 
hence in the presence of phenomenological phenomena that we now have to 
reach by piercing through the surrounding and ontical reality of the work of 
art. As a matter of fact, the thing and the art are both present and represented 
in the «there» of the work of art, in the apparent spatiality of the work of art 
as cpaiveoxai. Does that mean that the «there» of the thing and the «there» 
of art are not the same and that both cohere in the «there» of the work of art? 
If by «there» I mean the space in which a phenomenon gives itself by 
showing what it is and how it is, that is by being that which it can only be as 
it is in itself, then it appears that the «thing-being»^^ does not give itself as 
the art-being  and that for each of them correspond two different «there». In 
that respect, it is for me possible to encounter the two of them at two 
different times since they exclusively give themselves in the «there» seen as 
the opening that they themselves open by giving themselves. The «there» of 
the thing, as that which withdraws from my gaze, therefore becomes 
manifest as a «non-the re» which is yet not nothing but the «there» of the 
«non-there», a non-apparent «there». It is as such that I must envision a 
possible contact with the thing «resting in itself», that is to say the thing as 
it is in itself, in its non-appearance:
Ibid., p.157.
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«We ought to turn towards the being, think about it in regard to its Being, 
but by means o f  this thinking at the same time let it rest upon itse lf in its
19very own essence» .
To think the thing now means to follow the «path o f  thinking»  down to 
the thing-being  which turns out to be greatly «resistant»  to any definition. 
The notion of resistance here stands in the absence of contact with the thing. 
Without this contact, there is no space of encounter where the «there» of my 
preoccupation can meet with the «there» of the donation of the phenomenon.
Here phenomenology works as a definition of that which the thing is not. 
Any other kind of definition would now automatically be a discrimination, 
an insult not respecting the thing as it is in itself. That which it is not, is an 
apparent phenomenon and if  we manage to enter into contact with its 
phenomenal «there», it will be either in respect of its silence, which is 
already one of its modes of being, or it will not be at all:
«Must not this strange and uncommunicative fea ture  o f  the essence o f  the
thing become intimately fam ilia r  to thought that tries to think the thing?
I f  so, then we should  not fo rce  our way to its thingly character»^^.
Phenomenology is consequently the only appropriate method for such an 
investigation. It does not propose a metaphysical demonstration of what is 
beyond physics and does not appear to our senses. It proceeds to a
Ibid.,p.l57
^®Ibid.,p.l57.
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progressive description of the phenomenon as it shows itself from itself and 
in itself. As a setting-into-question of what appears before my eyes, it 
always and first is a setting-into-contact with the «manifest»  (SZ 29) which, 
as such, manifests itself as a presence in a «there» in which I can project my 
phenomenological eyes. This manifest «there» is the first revealed element 
which, opening the doors of its enacted being, enables me to guess another 
something which only announces itself in it. The revealed phenomenon turns 
into a revealing one setting me into contact with the non-apparent. In the 
light of the apparent «there» of my primary phenomenon, something 
becomes manifest in its non-manifestation, something becomes visible in its 
invisibility.
6, The Phenom enological Thing
We have set into question the presence of the empirical «there» which 
now appears as the thing-being  of the work of art. The work is first present 
as a thing insofar as it ontically gives itself in the «there» of its existence. 
As it is said in Sein und Zeit, existence is
«the kind o f  Being towards which Dasein can comport itse lf in one way or 
another, and always does comport itse lf somehow» (SZ 12).
In the introduction, we had mentioned how The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art 
differs from Sein und Zeit in the sense that it is «a path across
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phenom enology down to the thinking o f  being»^^ by the means of a dialogical 
tension between Dasein and the work of art. Dasein loses its central position. 
It is put in the presence of the work of art as the fundamental experience 
where it encounters itself as a being that «is», so that, living in that 
experience, it can direct its question towards the sense of its «I am» as a 
being that is. In other words, Dasein encounters its existing being, that is to 
say that it encounters itself within the reflexive consciousness of the 
question that it asks about itself. These statements are probably the most 
important ones of our reflection; they explicitly state the significance of the 
setting into presence of a phenomenon in a moment of encounter, of contact 
between the questioned and the questioning, the revealed and the revealing. 
In this space of perception and donation, an existential field opens within the 
empirical disclosedness of the «there». By that, I mean that the work of art 
always and already appears to me as an entity that is, an entity that came to 
birth in the workshop of the artist and that is bound to hold in the space of 
its «there», whether it is the «there» of the workshop, the «there» of a 
museum, the «there» of a heart or, as we shall see it later, the "there" of the 
world which it itself evokes. And yet it is doomed to express itself in an 
empirical «there» which discloses itself not only in the «what» of its 
represented ontical reality, but in the essential «who» enabling a «what» to 
take place. Having a conscience of the quiddity of the "there" means to let it 
express itself as it is in itself, in the harmonious «equiprimordiality»  
between its explicit (ontical) presence-at-hand  and its implicit recall. It also 
means to cast into light, to make it manifest. The «there» is recognised as the
Otto Poggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path o f  Thinking (Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press 
International, 1989)
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Space of encounter the function of which is also its nature, that is a space-in- 
between that I suddenly consider fully and that I perceive as a phenomenon 
of its own. It then becomes possible to ask the question of the what and the 
how, that is to say what and how it is in its way of behaving as an expression 
of its own being. The new phenomenological phenomenon is now located 
within the existence itself, the existing «there» of the work of art.
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From Being There to There-Being
1, Thing and Ontology
The object of this primary approach has been to see the work of art as 
an empirical presence and to perceive its own space of donation disclosing 
itself within its disclosed «there». In other words, we have relocated the 
work of art within one of its modes of donation, that is to say that which 
makes it visible to the eye, the thingly «there».
This effort of relocation of the work-being within its thing-being appears, 
at first sight, as a dislocation of the work of art which, to a certain extent, is 
no longer perceived as a work of art. If the work of art is indeed a thing, it is 
yet not called so and its distinctive feature certainly does not lie in its 
thingness. It is always a thing and yet it is always more than a thing. The 
traditional art critics will undoubtedly stress the more and leave aside the 
thingly element which is taken for granted and therefore void of interest. 
They will linger on the aesthetic value of a particular work of art and 
probably ponder on the particular details of this particular work of art. As 
far as our reflection is concerned, it is the unity of its being that we are
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looking for. If the work of art is always more than a thing, it is yet not less 
than a thing. What is «at work» is at least a thing. For the work of art to be 
such, it has to be a thing as well. We are facing here an undeniable fact, the 
work of art, in its «thingly substructure»^^, is «present-at-hand»  or «can with 
some right and within certain limits be taken as merely present-at-hand»  (SZ 
56). Through these remarks, different ontological manifestations become 
perceptible. The very perception of these different manifestations enable us 
at least not to fall into the prejudice of the Selbstverstaendnis, of that which 
goes without saying because it is so obvious:
«The status o f  the ontological analytic shows, however, that we have been 
fa r  from  interpreting these obvious matters with an adequate grasp, still 
less with regard fo r  the meaning o f  their Being; and we are even fa rth er  
from  possessing a stable coinage fo r  the appropriate structural concepts» 
(SZ55).
The work of art therefore has to be considered and perceived as a «factual 
Being-present-at-hand»  (SZ 56) which means here «happening», taking 
place, occurring. It takes place as any other thing does because it is a thing 
in the first place. This statement bears important consequences in terms of 
fundamental ontology. Our phenomenological gaze reduced the phenomenon 
of the work of art to the phenomenon of the thing. We have gone through a 
step of dévitalisation, of de-animation of the work of art which now appears 
in its thingly substructure. In other words, we are considering the work of art
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in that which it has in common with all that stands in the span of the es gibt, 
of the there is, that is to say the thing:
«The stone in the road is a thing, as is the clod in the field . A ju g  is a 
thing, as is the well beside the road. But what about the m ilk in the ju g  
and the water in the well? These too are things i f  the cloud in the sky and  
the thistle in the field , the le a f in the autumn breeze and the hawk over 
the wood, are rightly called by the name o f  thing»^^.
The thing is that which gathers within its name the whole of that which 
is, the whole of the things. A human being is undoubtedly more than a thing 
but yet answers the criteria of a thing and can consider him or herself as 
such. It is because it has the reflexive capacity to see itself as a thing that it 
can always be more than that. Everything is a thing and to miss the work of 
art’s thingness also means to miss the ontological reality of the thing as 
such.
Our task is to set into question the origin of the work of art and therefore 
to perceive it as the phenomenon which is cast into light in the «there» of my 
question. The equiprim ordial relationship between the artist and the artwork 
showed us that the origin only gives itself in its «concealment». This is what 
constitutes the difficulty of our enterprise and the necessity of 
phenomenology which alone is able to highlight the around  and the within of 
the «there» in which it can only give itself. For that matter, the access to our
23 Ibid., p.146.
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ultimate and originary element found a starting point in the concept of 
essence. The question, as we have seen it, now becomes; what is the essence 
of the work of art?
2. The Ontological Value o f  the Thing
What immediately loses its function of whatness. It no longer refers to 
that which stands as an expression of the essence but it refers to the quiddity  
of the essence; my question immediately takes the following form: what is 
the is of the essence of the work of art? Everything that is is by definition a 
thing that is. A fundamental ontology will then have to be developed in 
regard to the quiddity  of all things. But what is it that is of all things 
including the is of the work of art? Undoubtedly, it is and has to be the is- 
ness of the work of art. We have questioned the is-ness of the work of art by 
making manifest the different modes of donation related to its different 
modes of being. So far, it is the thing-being  which has «solicited»  our gaze. 
Its importance is fundamental inasmuch as it constitutes the thingly 
substructure by which a work of art can be a work of art and be present-at- 
hand  in the field of es gibt. It is in the same mode as anything else. The 
prospect of a fundamental ontology cannot ignore the thingly aspect of a 
work of art even though it seems to be always more than a thing. Again, not 
to direct our question towards the thing in the work would automatically 
close the gates of fundamental ontology and would, at best, lead us towards a 
semi-conscious regional ontology.
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Without revealing what the thingness is in its essence, we have still 
paved the way towards its full recognition by taking it into consideration as 
a mode of expression of Being and as one possible mode of donation of the 
work of art still perceived in its unity. The unity is here a phenomenon o f  a 
general order described as the phenomenon of the work of art in which the 
phenomenon of the thing inhabits. Indeed, it inhabits the frame of the work 
of art, the trait, each spot of  colour, it is in the «there» o f  all that makes it 
hold in its empirical reality. The thingness of the work of art, we find it in 
the holding. The thingly element holds in the holding; it is no longer the this 
or that put together as in a «matter-form structure», it is the putting-together  
itself for the purpose of a determined «usefulness» presenting the object, this 
time, in its m atter-form structure:
«the interfusion o f  form  and matter prevailing here is moreover, 
controlled beforehand by the purposes served by jug , axe, shoes». 
Therefore, «Usefulness is the basic fea ture  from  which this being  
regards us, that is, fla shes at us and thereby is presen t and thus is this 
being»^"^.
The unity of the work of art, that is its artistic value, its matter-form 
structure and its thingly substance, holds in the holding of the entity, in its 
thingness.
The «there» of the work of art is therefore present in the «there» of the
24 Ibid., p. 154
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thing which gives the work of art the ontical possibility of setting something 
called art into work. In that respect, the work of art can be present-at-hand  
(Vorhandenheit). In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger uses the term Vorhandenheit in 
order to differentiate between ontological existence and the mere taking  
place. In traditional ontology, to exist meant to take place and could 
therefore not be applied to the entities responding to the question who?. A 
who never takes place, it is always somewhere else than where it stands 
before somebody else’s eyes. As a who, I can never be constrained to the 
«there» of my location. I always dislocate the «there» of my ontical presence 
in order to relocate it within the «there» of my pre-occupations. In other 
words, I take place in my pre-occupations which, in turn, project me within a 
«there» which I now occupy and which stands as a «there» because I occupy 
it. In traditional ontology, «existentia is tantam ount to Being-present-at- 
hand, a kind o f  Being which is essentially inappropriate to entities o f  
D a se in ’s character»  (SZ 42). As we have seen it before, existence for 
Heidegger stands as the way an entity always comports itself towards its 
being. It implies a sense of belonging to being, a necessary urge of «to be» 
(Zu-sein) because «Being is that which is an issue fo r  every such entity» (SZ 
42). Existence becomes synonymous with setting oneself into question, that 
is to say to ask oneself the question of one’s own being; existing is 
essentially the reflexive capacity of being turned towards one’s own being, 
the enlightening conscience asking: who am I? To exist means to be pre­
occupied by one’s presence-at-hand  perceived as an expression of Being. In 
that respect, the question who am I  exists, my existence exists, an existential
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analytic towards ontology exists, phenomenology exists and, as we shall see 
it, the work of art exists.
3, The «There» o f  Existence
Existence is not something about which one can say that it takes 
place in but, rather, that through the act of  taking place in, it stands as an 
expression of itself. Existence ex-ists, which means that it “ is” as a 
projection made possible by its consciousness. I always am within the 
projection (the “ex-pression”) of my thinking and, when, as Dasein, I am 
contemplating my thinking being (towards which my intention is turned), I 
im-press what it ex-presses. Ex-istence is always a capacity not to let a 
phenomenon go in the disorganised jungle of the world of the things and to 
relate it to an organising consciousness enabling the thing-world. Existence, 
because it is always and already outside (in the «what» of my environment), 
is the what and the how  an outside is never on the other side (that which I 
cannot see since, as a being that is, I can never leave the realm of Being) but 
always the inside of my thinking scope:
«Beings can be as beings only i f  they stand within and stand out 
within what is cleared in this clearing. Only this clearing grants and
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guarantees to us humans a passage to those beings that we ourselves
are not, and access to the being that we ourselves are» 25
In the light of these considerations, it appears quite clearly that a 
study about the work o f  art comes back to a study about the «there» in which 
it has to be located. We have seen that a work of art can be and has to be re­
located within the there of its thingness. That means to read the work of art 
as a thing-being. Yet, when we contemplate a work of art, we hardly think in 
terms of thingness. The work of art in its unity proposes, offers, a 
represented universe that I enjoy as such. Indeed, the Shoes by Van Gogh 
immediately projects us within a world given by the work of art itself: «To 
work-being there belongs the setting up o f  a world»^^. The painting is 
present to us in its total absence of belonging; nothing in it can replace it in 
its right context. The shoes it represents are there in the nudity  of the 
«there». It no longer is the context which justifies their presence, but it is 
the shoes themselves which allow any context to take place. The shoes give 
themselves from themselves as they are in themselves. They are their own 
presence, the auto-justification of their being-there: «A p a ir  o f  peasant shoes 
and nothing more. A nd  yet.»^^ The whole of Heidegger’s philosophy stands 
in the yet. We have here a setting-into-question of the yet. Nothing in the 
painting tells us how to read it and yet we cannot help seeing it and reading 
it: to read it in a way that can and has to be ours. Art reads in the first person 
singular but reads in the infinite ways of the infinite projective
Ibid., p. 178. 
Ibid., p. 171. 
Ibid., p. 159
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consciousness. In the yet, the work of art expects. It expects us to read it. 
The strength of Heidegger’s essay lies in the expectation of a reading, of an 
understanding of the work of art, and not in the form of the reading. The 
same painting in a technologically advanced society would probably evoke 
the memory of the good old days ; in a big city it would certainly revive the 
colours and scents of our childhood. Art is not what we see in it, but it is the 
fact that we always see something in it. It is part of the work of art as a 
phenomenon to give itself in the range of its belonging possibilities. This is 
what the work of art expects us to do, that is to replace it into a coherent and 
systematic articulation.
Yet, the truth of our articulated system does not alter the truth of the 
shoes alone. Truth does not stand in the accuracy of our interpretation. It is 
not here synonymous with concordance between two predicates based on a 
judgement. It is essentially ante-predicative. The shoes give themselves from 
themselves as they are in themselves, in the nudity of their «there», in the 
ontical absence of «references and signs»  (SZ §17). Truth here means the 
casting into light the shoes themselves which, deprived of any point of 
reference, suddenly appear in the totality of the contexts to which they could  
have belonged. 1 do not mean here that truth lies in the whole of the 
contexts, but that inside the ontical possibility of such or such context, the 
absolute necessity of at least one (any context, its ontical form does not 
matter) is present. One context, any context, opens in its having to be {Zu- 
sein). The artistic dislocation of a thing from its context, makes manifest, by 
our relocating reading, the necessity of a location, that is the location of a
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thing within a larger frame. If the truth of our interpretation is based on the 
coherence of our judgement, that is to say the non resistance of A put 
together with B, the shared and public knowledge that this is exact, truth in 
its artistic essence stands beyond our judgement and lies in the unveiling of 
the shoes seen as a thing in itself in its behaviour to the world of the things. 
With Heidegger, and certainly with Husserl before him, truth is reconciled 
with the Greek etymology of Aletheia. It means here absence of 
concealment, even though, for that matter, the phenomenon has to be read as 
concealment.
But how does a thing come to open itself in its mode of being? How 
does the work of art bring forth the opening of that thing which it 
represents? For that matter, the stress is not put on the empirical and ontical 
manifestation of the interpretation itself but on the pre-interpretative mode, 
on the pre-hermeneutic value of our phenomenological gaze. Indeed, it is the 
act of seeing which unveils the thing as it is in itself and if for us to see 
instinctively means to understand, as in an interpretative reading, we will 
then read the reading as an action highlighting the behaviour of  a 
phenomenon in the «there» that it occupies. To interpret, we are compelled 
to do it; it is part of  our perception of any phenomenon; interpretation no 
longer refers to a settled science, rather, it refers to our mode of being, that 
which we cannot help but do lest we should stop being.
We have then seen the thing and its thing-there. It presented itself as a 
pair of shoes that we have read as such, in the «naked [there] in the nothing
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o f  the world»{^Z  187, 343, 276)^^. The thingness of the thing is still obscure 
in our reflection. It remains to be defined. Yet, we can already say that the 
shoes are set into work in the work of art. Taken as a thing deprived of its 
belonging to a particular environment, the thing-there is limited to the 
periphery and the inside of its ontical reality. Its «there» stands in the limits 
of its presence~at~hand. And yet, the work of art always drags us beyond the 
image present before our eyes. From the ihm g-there  of the shoes that we 
have reached by interrogating the artwork in its unity, we shift to the «there» 
of the re-presented thing. From the work of art as a statue, we shift to the 
work of art as a mirror. That does not mean that it is one or another, or one 
then another. It is both at the same time. In the case of our painting, the 
thing always is a statue, an element within its world, as much as it is always 
a mirror of the world which it itself evokes. It is an element within a world 
which is its own world. For that matter, the work of art brought us inside the 
evocative darkness of the shoes, within the enlightening disclosedness of its 
set-into-work «thereness».
Otto Poeggeler, Martin Heidegger’s Path o f  Thinking, (Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press 
International, 1989) p. 169
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4, The Work o f  A rt as Statue and M irror
The work of art originates in a world. It is the image of a historical 
state in which it is thrown and which always surrounds and overwhelms it. It 
is mediated by a cultural horizon, a canon, and only through this mediation 
the work of art can express itself in its singularity. We have briefly 
introduced the work of art as an equipment, as an equipmental quality whose 
value lies in its usefulness. «But what about this usefulness i t s e l f ? As it is 
said in The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art., the usefulness appears when
«the peasant women wears her shoes in the field . Only here are they 
what they are. They are all the more genuinely so, the less the peasant 
woman thinks about the shoes while she is at work, or looks at them at 
all, or is even aware o f  them.»^^
To understand the concept of usefulness therefore means to have the 
unifying capacity to organise the ontical diversity into a meaningful whole. 
The shoes’ usefulness, as the word shows it, aims at being useful by serving 
a larger purpose. It is not a matter of  wearing the shoes for the sake of it. 
The shoes serve for the harvesting of the field, the hope for a generous crop. 
The shoes, as soon as they perform their useful task, immediately sink into 
oblivion. Their reality suddenly disintegrates and within the empty 
equipmental usefulness of the thing, the «uncomplaining worry as to the
^^Ibid.,p.l59
Ibid.,p.l59
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certainty o f  bread» pervades. The usefulness of a thing refers to the presence 
of something else. Something is useful only with regard to something else 
and it is so inasmuch as «it has the character o f  the in-order-to»  (SZ 78). 
The object, in its totality, needs be taken as a reference to something else. It 
becomes a sign pointing at another one and, together, they make manifest the 
presence of another invisible phenomenon, that is the constitution of the 
enterprise. The work of art, perceived as an equipmental value, loses its 
artistic plenitude which is now conceived in order to serve a purpose which 
does not belong to it; for that matter, it could refer to its trading value, the 
economic status which it occupies in a museum. Such a consideration of the 
represented object does not allow us to perceive it as it is in itself; the shoes 
disseminate in the mode of belonging to a specific world, they scatter in the 
infinite possibilities of the in order to which takes the thing apart from 
itself. The work of art taken as a work of art implies the de-connection to the 
in-order-to. The edifice of usefulness must entirely collapse for the thing in 
itself to come back within the there of its authentic {eigentlich) image. By 
authentic we have to understand a sense of belonging to oneself. With the in- 
order-to, the phenomenon in question is no longer the individual image of a 
thing, but the thing + connection + thing... . We therefore find ourselves in 
the presence of an invisible phenomenon, a set, whose members are all 
representing and represented by the set. In such a set, the element is granted 
a meaning whose truth is based on its accordance and non-resistance to the 
final purpose. The value of the set rests on the validity of the connections 
and not on the individual presence of the elements. In other words, the 
elements lose their thingly character for the profit o f an invisible and
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articulated phenomenon. The thing suddenly does not belong to itself, it no 
longer is a phenomenal whole but is part of the act of putting together 
fragments. We witness here a betrayal of the quiddity of the thing which is 
now perceived as « What is it »? and no longer « Who is it? ».
For that reason, the shoes are represented in the naked «there» of non­
involvement. They are deprived of the environment in which they take the 
equipmental value of the in-order-to. The thing in question is relocated 
within the «there» of its auto-sufficiency and expresses itself from itself as it 
is in itself. Only because the edifice of usefulness collapses, the thing 
expresses itself as the being of the entity which it always is. In the act of 
withdrawing the phenomenon from its participation to a larger frame, by 
reducing it to that which it is when it is not in order to, the thing fully 
expresses itself as a presence recalled in its ontical "there”. Yet, «as a rule it 
is the use-objects {Gebrauchdinge) around us that are the nearest and the 
proper th ings»^\ If so far our task has been to find the thing in the work and 
to cast it into light in its absence of usefulness, we still cannot ignore the 
equipmental being of the shoes. The shoes, taken in their thingly 
substructure, do not stop serving the purpose determining that which they are 
in their matter-form structure. It is because the need of protecting our feet 
arose that we were able to witness the birth of the thing in the shoes. The 
thingly value as well as the equipmental one turn out to be «equiprimordial», 
they express themselves in each other’s light. The absence of equipmental 
consideration in the shoes as a thing therefore shows us the thing as it is in
31 Ibid., pp.154-155.
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itself, that is to say in its satisfaction, its «provenance», its «boundless 
presum ption», its «semblance o f  evidence»^^, its having-to-be  which also is, 
in this particular instance, a having-to-be a piece of equipment. Indeed, if  
the pair of shoes finds itself in «non-involvem ent», in its thingly having-to- 
be without being in-order-to, what then prevails in the withdrawing within 
the thing is the frustration of the equipmental side of the phenomenon.
What we notice in Van Gogh’s shoes seen as a thing, is that the essential 
desire of having-to-be an equipment is sacrificed in the work of art. In that 
sense, the work of art enables a setting into work of that which the thing is 
in its having to be, at once, the whole of its manifestations, the entirety of 
all the empirical and ontical forms that it can assume. It enables an act of 
disclosedness of the thing, a moment of revelation during which the thing 
expresses all that it can be, either as a withdrawn being "there" in the image 
of the shoes or as « There Being  » in the thing which claims its belonging to 
its mode of being, that is to say the thing in its equipmental reserve. In its 
non-involvement, the having-to-be in-order-to is pressurised within the 
«carnal sacrifice»  of the artistic constraint. It becomes an insisting presence. 
It affirms itself as an ex-isting recall. The work of art allows a «wanting-to~ 
have-a~conscience» o f  that which usually projects the thing into oblivion; by 
that I mean that the equipment, as already mentioned, is forgotten within the 
larger purpose it serves as soon as it starts being in use. In the non- 
actualisation of the in-order-to, the having-to-be in use is highlighted. In the 
wanting-to-have-a-conscience of the in-order-to, the in-order-to suddenly 
turns towards itself, it becomes the "there" of its own preoccupation which is
Ibid.,p.l57.
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«pre-occupied» «for-the-sake-of»  itself. The factual connection of and to, 
does not allow us visualise the act of setting-into-connection. In that respect, 
it is already forgotten for the benefit of the ontical elements of the 
connection. What matters here is the cement and the jo in ing-together  
activity:
«Not only do we lack the cement; even the schema in accordance with 
which this jo in ing-together is to be accomplished, has been split asunder, 
or never as ye t unveiled. What is decisive fo r  ontology is to prevent the 
splitting o f  the phenom enon, in other words, to hold its positive  
phenom enal content secure»  (SZ 132).
In order to prevent the splitting of the phenomenon and to hold its 
positive phenomenal content secure, it has to be understood in the light of 
the regional system it belongs to (which, in turn, can and will have to be 
understood in the same way in the light of an even wider system which 
ultimately will encompass itself in the form of a comprehensive horizon). 
The periphery of the phenomenon cannot be limited to the ontical envelope 
of its empirical "there"; it has to be held secure within the field of 
signification in which the phenomenon takes its place as such or such piece 
of equipment.
Stepping back from our text The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, it seems 
that Heidegger’s conception of phenomenology starts at this very point. 
What is in question here is the passage from the ontical "there" of the work
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of art to the "there" of the world which it presents and into which we can but 
feel drawn. The presence of this passage reveals the importance of a 
particular point found, in the first place, in Husserl’s Ideen, that is the 
«categorial intuition». The categorial intuition stands as a synthetic act in 
which the possible multiplicity of a phenomenon is gathered within a 
unifying state of consciousness. It allows us to have a one and single 
conscious representation of the different aspects that the visible object can 
have. The empirical form is then reduced to its ante-predicative mode as a 
structural idea. This synthetisation of the ontical potentiality by the 
categorial intuition is expressed in the Cartesian Meditations^^ through the 
example of a cube;
«Je prends par exemple, pour objet de description la perception d 'un  
cube. Je vois alors, dans la réflexion pure, que ce cube individuel 
m ’est donné d ’une façon  continue comme une unité objective, et cela 
dans une m ultiplicité variable et multiforme d ’aspects (modes de 
présentation) liés par des rapports déterminés»^"^.
The synthetic effort is here applied to an individual entity the perception 
and the perceptive understanding of which refer only to itself. The very same 
fact of synthetic structure can also be exercised on a phenomenon composed 
of various constitutive elements; indeed, if  I decide to place this cube in the
Husserl Edmund, Méditations Cartésiennes. Introduction à la Phénoménologie, Ed. Vrin, (Paris 1986) 
"If, for instance, I take as an object the perception o f a cube. What I see on the plane of pure reflection 
is that this particular cube is offered in a continuous fashion as an objective entity, and that within a 
number of varying and multiform aspects (modes of presentation) it is bound together by a series of 
determined relationships" (translation mine).
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hands of a child, my understanding of the phenomenon varies significantly. I 
can either refer to the constitutive elements only, or I can perceive it as a 
unified image bringing forth the concept of "noemato-noétique" unity. In the 
second instance I am in the presence of a new invisible object characterised 
by a categorial form. It is precisely this categorial intuition which allows me 
to replace the phenomenon within a meaningful context. Meaning does not 
stand in the individual phenomenon but in the act of putting together 
different facts which either accord to or resist the setting into connection. 
The phenomenological meaning points at the act of setting into connection 
itself; in that sense, phenomenology becomes hermeneutic. It is the 
organising consciousness enabling the understanding of a whole.
Let us refer to an example in order to grasp what is for Heidegger an 
ontological phenomenon and for Husserl a transcendental mode, that is to 
say the synthetic perception of categorial intuition. Let us take the 
phenomenon of the office in a village church; it is required and necessary for 
the priest to be either empirical or phenomenological. The priest, as in any 
village, is considered as the man of the village; should the need arise, he is 
the one people naturally consult outside the church, and, should the need 
arise, he is the one inviting people to confession. This implies a one to one 
relationship, a taking into account the individual who is part of a community. 
In this case, the priest has an empirical mode of relating to his parishioner 
which he cannot ignore during the office. Behind the altar he recognises 
familiar faces on which he can put names. On the other hand, the priest, 
according to the liturgical hierarchy, stands as the medium between two
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worlds. In that respect, all the familiar faces merge into one and single 
community and the names fuse into the spirit of God. In this moment of 
sharing the priest needs to have a phenomenological gaze through which his 
categorial intuition reveals a new invisible object, a phenomenal reality, that 
is a community. And only in that very instant, his prayers welcome the 
descending grace which, in turn, sees and hears the will of each for the good 
of all. The phenomenological priest, in this moment of communication, sees 
the «to see», he hears the «to hear» and becomes messenger of God, the 
hermeneutic prophet, Hermes. The categorial perception is not limited to the 
perception of that new invisible phenomenon announcing itself through the 
constitutive elements present before my eyes; being an act of spontaneous 
reconstruction of that which is given by the sensible intuition, this 
reconstructed entity becomes reconstructing. Here stands the new distinction 
between the «revealed» and the «revealing». The conscious re-presentation 
of an empirically given phenomenon gives access to the idea of the 
phenomenon. Through the phenomenological vision of the community, the 
priest can suddenly grab the idea of a community, any community towards 
which he is turned any time his categorial intuition provides him with the 
idea of it. The phenomenological phenomenon of community revealed by the 
sensible intuition in turn reveals of a higher concept of community in which 
the sensible presence of the individual is not needed. Truly, ideas can be 
seen, although they do not stand in front of our eyes. Phenomenology, by 
piercing its way through the empirical obstacle reaches the world of the idea 
without leaving the subjective sphere and by the same process sets us into
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contact with the idea of the world without questioning the existence of 
external reality.
In the light of the categorial intuition, we now discern how the field of 
experience is not limited to the empirical reality seen by our senses. Who 
wants to see is not entitled to see. It is the result of a difficult labour that 
Heidegger developed throughout Sein und Zeit. Although Husserl opened the 
sphere of a wider experience, he nonetheless miscarried the recognition of 
the «to see» and somehow left behind the question of «who» (the quid) is the 
being of intentionality itself. As for Heidegger, he initiated his 
investigations by presenting a more radically phenomenological 
interpretation of the noetic-noematic correlation in which phenomenology 
has to understand itself according to its own condition of possibility, that is 
to say its phenomenological and ontological presence as Vorhandenheit. As a 
consequence of the former analysis, we consciously manage to catch a 
glimpse of the question of ontology. The world, as an eidetic reality, is now 
present before my eyes and gives itself as any other phenomena. To replace 
our reflection in a philosophical context, I can say that we are now at the end 
of Husserl’s philosophy and at the threshold of Heidegger’s. We are at the 
point where an eidetic reality becomes perceptible to the phenomenological 
eye, not as a noumenal notion but as a phenomenological phenomenon. I 
hope the reader will allow me not to enter the details of Kantian philosophy 
forbidding the jump from phenomenal to noumenal realities in which a 
cognitive duality is preserved for the sake of sensible intuition.
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Let US now come back to the Origin o f  the Work o f  Art. We now have 
a better idea of the importance of an educated phenomenological gaze. To 
be able to perceive intuition in its categorial mode means that we can now 
focus on the conditions of possibility for the passage from the "thing-there" 
to the "work-there" to happen. As we have said before, the wanting to have a 
conscience o f  the in order to for the sake o f  itse lf releases the shoes in their 
wanting to be shoes. The shoes become shoes in their presence-at-hand, in 
their equipmentality, that is in their fac tua l meaningful context. As such, 
they reveal themselves as shoes. It is thus the revelation of the shoes as 
shoes expressing themselves as they are in themselves which is important 
here. In the work of art, the shoes are set into work so that they can let free 
their essential constitution «from which and by which [they] are what [they] 
are and how [they] are»^^. The work of art puts us into the presence of the 
having-to-be shoes of the shoes; by reducing the factual shoes to their mere 
factual presence, we operate a dévitalisation of the subjective 
implementations usually attributed to the shoes which accompany us in the 
variable and personal activities o f  our different lives. In the work of art, an 
authentic relocation of the being of the shoes is at stake so that they become 
an authentic expression of themselves and not an inauthentic expression of 
our tribulations. In the nudity o f  the naked [there] in the nothing o f  the 
world, they function as a mirror of the world which welcomes them into a 
context of signification :
«From the dark opening o f  the worn insides o f  the shoes the toilsome 
tread o f  the worker stares forth . In the stiffly rugged heaviness o f  the
Ibid., p.l
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shoes there is the accum ulated tenacity o f  her slow trudge through the 
far-spreading  and ever-uniform furrow s o f  the f ie ld  swept by a raw  
wind>f^\
Again, what matters here does not lie in the ontical particularity of our 
interpretation. The important point dwells in the faculty the shoes have to 
motivate our interpretative nature. I can interpret all that stands before my 
eyes any time I feel concerned by it. For that matter, I can purposely drag a 
normal pair of shoes out of its daily oblivion and, by the means of my 
natural interpretative mode, I can reach the same reading as with the shoes in 
the work of art. This statement will now enable us to approach and define 
that which is at work in the work of art. What we see in the shoes of the 
work of art, we can also see in any pair of shoes. We then need to have a 
particular gaze on the shoes and stop thinking ahead about the walk or the 
tennis game that they will enable. In other words, it means that we need to 
get rid of the everyday conception of the shoes we usually have in order to 
dislocate from the ontical oblivion in which they dwell and relocate them 
within the spotlight of  my concern. It is not a daily occupation to perceive 
the shoes as such. It costs an effort inasmuch as the shoes suddenly stand 
outside my articulated and re-presented environment in which things are 
present-at-hand  for the sake of my own convenience. They are suddenly 
deprived of their usefulness which I praise insofar as a useless pair of shoes 
is not worth a penny. I therefore tend to avoid thinking of an equipment in 
non-equipmental terms and, consequently, fail to consider it as a thing-in- 
itself. The work of art, on the other hand, deliberately relocates the shoes in
36 Ibid., p.159.
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their thingly presence. In that respect, they motivate, not to say urge, a 
thingly reading of the re-presented object. They spare us an effort which we 
do not naturally make, and even always forget to make. The fact that it 
belongs to the pair of  shoes to evoke the world they originated in, 
undoubtedly shows that a work of art does not «tell us a story». It is not 
about the telling a story about shoes, it is about the capacity to let the shoes 
tell us their own story. The shoes, and only the shoes, have the monopoly of 
their mode of being which they express in a sense of belonging to their own 
being. A work of art has thus no interest in reproducing reality. Its purpose 
is to let the phenomenon be itself and express itself as it is in itself from 
itself. What is at work in the work of art is definitely the thing and only the 
thing. The work of art deals with the deliberate act of placing us into contact 
with the thing itself. It is therefore an effort of seeing the thing itself and 
expressing it as it expresses itself. Because the work of art shows the thing 
as it is in itself, the thing, letting go all that it is and will ever be, motivates 
and solicits our interpretative gaze which surprises itself in its incapacity to 
refrain from its activity. Indeed, it no longer is our gaze which chooses to be 
interpretative, it is the shoes themselves which call for an interpretation by 
recalling that which they essentially are. Art does not create, it does not 
reproduce, it only unveils and discovers that which our gaze cannot see. 
Heidegger quotes Albrecht Dürer who says:
«For in truth, art lies hidden within nature; he who can wrest it from  her,
has it»^^.
37 Ibid., p. 195.
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Art means to drag the thing as it is out, to cast it into light and unbind it
38from its «captivity»  within other entities.
Ibid., p. 192.
66
Recognition o f the There
Recognition of the There
1, Dislocation and Relocation o f  the "There^^
The conclusion of the former chapter made manifest the different 
"there" related to the different modes of donation of the phenomenon. It 
gives itself as an expression of its being, through which it recalls its 
belonging to this constitutive being. To see and read a phenomenon means to 
be willing to understand it, to comprehend it as it is in itself. To know it 
means to be wanting to see it in its being. The mode of donation that has 
been privileged so far is undoubtedly the mode of donation of the thing in 
itself as it gives itself in "the naked [that] in the nothing o f  the w orld”. We 
are dealing here with a premeditated isolation of the thing (the shoes) 
through which it expresses itself as it is in itself. In other words, the shoes 
suddenly withdraw within the essential totality of their thing-being  in the 
light of which they always have to be (Zusein):
"The more solitary the work, f ix e d  in the figure, stands on its own and  
the more cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings, the more 
simply does the thrust come into the open that such a work is, and the
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more essentially is the extraordinary thrust to the surface and what is 
long-fam iliar thrust down
Only then the shoes can show themselves as they are in themselves, that 
is as they are in their essential and unitary constitution of their structural 
complexity. The shoes reveal themselves in the congregating (it is indeed 
this unity which is at work in the work of art) "massiveness and heaviness” 
of their immediate tangibility which "sets fo r th ”"^  ^ that which they are in 
their totality, that is the shoes in their "reliability”, in their usefulness. The 
shoes, as a thing, are that which we perceive in the naked that in the nothing  
o f  the world  and the shoes as equipment, it that which we feel in the surprise 
of the presence of the thing (the shoes usually sink into oblivion for the 
benefit of the walk, they are forgotten in the comfort whose mode of being is 
the nudity of the sensation). The shoes surprise us because they are not 
where and how they usually are:
"When she takes o ff  her shoes late in the evening, in deep but healthy 
fatigue, and reaches out fo r  them again in the still dim dawn, or passes  
them by on the day o f  rest, she knows all this w ithout noticing or 
reflecting
They usually are in the realm of usefulness. There, they dwell in the 
systematic relationship of the in-order-to  in which they are granted a
Ibid., p. 191. 
Ibid., p. 171. 
Ibid., p. 160.
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signification (this signification does not require the consideration of the 
thing-being since the shoes are set into signification by being a sign 
referring, for instance, to the activity of walking):
"In our provisional interpretation o f  that structure o f  Being which 
belongs to the ready-to-hand (to equipment), the phenom enon o f  
reference or assignm ent became v is ib le” (SZ 77).
Yet, as we have already seen it, the shoes, when recaptured within the 
essential expression of their being, express themselves in the totality of what 
they are or could be, that is they claim their having to be ready-to-hand. 
They silently shout the need for a signification which they can only find 
within the environment they were conceived in and in which they find a 
"necessity and a nearness . By so doing or, rather, by so behaving, they 
put us into the presence of the idea of environment which I automatically 
translate into the ontical environment of  my own projective experience. 
Again, the shoes as thing claim their belonging to a specific environment 
which can only be the environment of the shoes. They would resist any 
attempt to place them in an environment which is not theirs. It does not mean 
that it is not possible, but such an attempt would " in su lt” them and they 
would all the more express their desire to be re-located in their proper 
significant system. For that matter, we could easily imagine a novice asking 
an art critic why M agritte’s rock floats in the air, and, undoubtedly, the 
answer to the question would stress the "setting up ” of the thing surprising
42 Ibid., p. 170.
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US in its singularity, that is in its paradoxical marginality which we only 
understand because a margin is such with regard to its centre. Art purposely 
operates an act of dislocation of the thing which, because it is a thing and 
expresses itself as such as it is in itself, complains of misuse and abuse and 
claims for a relocation in the world of its use. As a thing being also a piece 
of equipment, it claims for its comfort in which it would fall back into the 
silence of the naked sensation, into the discretion of its well-being.
2. The Disclosedness o f  the Entity
That which is at work in the work of art is the insistence of the shoes 
in their thingly-there which is only possible by the means of taking apart the 
edifice of usefulness, by the means of depriving the thing of its 
equipmentality, the present-at-hand of its ready-to-hand character, and let it 
claim for its unity, its totality. The shoes, by withdrawing within the 
essential totality of their having-to-be (Zu-sein) open themselves as the 
comprehensive horizon of their can-be :
"Towering up within itself, the work opens up a world and keeps it 
abidingly in fo r c e ”'^ ^
The notion of passage from the "there" of the shoes to the "there" of 
the set-at-work shoes now takes its full signification. The work of art drags
43 Ibid., p. 169.
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US into the subjective representation of its objective reality. Yet, this passage 
is not actualised by an effort of interpretative reconstruction. When I find 
myself contemplating the work of art that is there before my eyes, I never set 
myself to a task of clearing the way in the hope of extracting a meaningful 
element, of making some sense of something senseless. A proper approach to 
the work of art does not consist in dragging it down into the light of  my 
interpretative revision by first prying into it and second by exposing what 
has been found. The work of art already exposes itself; by ex-posing itself, it 
gives itself to our eyes which can delimit its space of donation and observe 
without invading it. For that matter, the work of art needs to be inviting, to 
be welcoming, not only by letting me inhabit its world, but by setting me 
forth in the setting into work itself. I can still freely decide to turn my back 
to it and walk the other way, but when I set my eyes on it, the work of art 
drags me inside, motivates my interest and conjures my interrogative gaze. If 
I find myself invading its space of donation it is exclusively because the 
work of art gives itself on the mode of surrender; it entirely submits and is 
fully itself in the act of submission. Indeed, the work of art is only a work of 
art when it is looked at. What we could think is nothing but an invasion is in 
fact a respectful response to the phenomenon which invites us to take over it, 
to work on it. By taking over, I mean to participate actively in the having-to- 
be a work of the work of art. I usurp or, to be more accurate, the work of art 
makes me usurp the title of artist inasmuch as I set myself into the work by 
having the thing at work opening itself within the field of signification 
which I can and have to provide if I look at it. In other words, I find myself 
in the obligation of setting myself into the work. The work of art confines
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itself within itself, it sequesters itself in a mode of sequestration belonging 
to itself and in which it allows me to find the key to the opening of its being. 
It now appears quite clearly that what is at work in the work of art is, on the 
one hand, the setting into work of the thing itself as it is in itself and, on the 
other hand, the setting into work of my own setting into work.
As already mentioned, we can always relate to any phenomenon in 
such a way. Truly, this is what we keep doing in the most trivial activities of 
our everyday lives. As much as we intend to cut away from our daily routine, 
we also treasure and cherish it. We shelter in the safety and the security it 
offers by unconsciously preventing the happening of the surprise and, 
therefore, by relocating all that stands in its singularity within the realm of 
the ready-to-hand  regularity. In other words, we dilute the presence of things 
within the presence of an organised whole, a represented and articulated 
system which is always within my reach because I can always keep an eye on 
it since its mode of being is to be there before my eyes for my hand 
(Zuhandenheit). Yet, my point of  reference, that is to say the what and the 
where and the how  I see the world around me, always dwells in the 
comforting presence of the ready to hand. Because it is ready, I do not have 
either to prepare or to look for. Indeed, the thing is already there before my 
eyes as a piece of equipment. The only thing I need to think of is the in- 
order-to, the particular usage for the purpose of that other thing which I have 
in mind. But even that other thing that I have in mind could also be forgotten 
for the profit of its usage. The worker working on the making of a knife will 
never think about it in terms of a thing but will already have before the
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confection and always have during the confection a conceptual idea of the 
matter-form complex of the thing. In that respect, either the piece of 
equipment is there before my eyes and I never have a conscience of its 
presence but always am ahead  of it in the projective visualisation of the in- 
order-to; or, still by the means of the in-order-to, I relocate the singular 
object within an organised and spatialised environment, in which case my 
attention is entirely absorbed in the aim of my action and forget the nature of 
my intention; I therefore cannot have a consciousness of my activity of 
relocation since the object is automatically put away so that it no longer 
requests our attention.
In a puzzle, only the piece that does not fit starts being considered as a 
piece of its own. We study its contour, its particular colour, first in the 
expectation of its non-resistance towards my organising skills, second with 
the recognition of its interesting and challenging nature, third with the 
hammer determined to square the consistency of its arrogance. Dasein is not 
keen on surprise and resistance. In the instance of the work of art, our 
organising systématisation is constantly at work insofar as the represented 
thing is constantly withdrawn within itself. It is submitted in its non­
submission. Again, by withdrawing within the essential totality of its having 
to be the thing that it is, the thing opens as the comprehensive horizon of its 
can-be. Only because of this inner tension - because of this dialogical 
commutation between the immediate tangibility of the thing and the world 
that it represents - the work of art sets into work the wanting-to-have-a- 
conscience first of the thing as it is in itself, second of the world of
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signification to which it belongs. The work of art fully becomes a work of 
art when it is subjected to the act of  relocation, and yet, it is such only 
because the thing that is at work never lets itself to be totally absorbed by it. 
It always opposes its presence as a "m ere” thing, it resists this particular 
attempt of relocation because it could always have been another one and 
therefore makes manifest the attempt itself in the contingency of its ontical 
emptiness.
3, The Entity as the Echo o f  a World
Because the thing originates in a world, it always claims its factual 
belonging to this world. Within it, the thing takes its signification and 
becomes a thing with an apparent meaning. We are speaking here of the 
world of the things that are around us in their ready-to-hand  proximity. If  a 
thing is also a piece of equipment (ready-to-hand), it will only be able to 
express itself within an equipmental world. As we have seen it, if  our 
phenomenological gaze pierces through a phenomenon and manages to grasp 
the underlying reality of the thing as it is in itself, the reality of its 
usefulness collapses. It volatilizes in the passage from the ontical "there" of 
the can be to the ontological "there" of the having to be (which also 
comprehends the having to be a useful piece of equipment). Grasping the 
thing as it is in itself therefore puts us into the presence of the fundamental 
terrain on/in which the thing expresses itself in the totality of its being. By
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delimiting the "there" of donation of the thing without invading it, the thing 
becomes the guide of our investigation about it. In order to inspect the 
intimacy of the thing, we first have to respect its privacy. It then guides us 
along the fundamental truth of its being in which its origin and its essence 
mingle. It becomes the ontical manifestation of the world in which it 
originated and in which it is condemned to be. Van Gogh’s shoes, from being 
a piece of equipment, are condemned to express their equipmentality within 
an equipmental world, whether it is the world o f  the peasant woman or the 
world of Van Gogh himself. In order to understand the contingency of such 
or such world, we have to bear in mind that we are not dealing with such or 
such pair of shoes but with the shoes as a thing which, as an expression of 
being, casts into light and movement the being of the world whose ontical 
reality allows their own ontical reality.
If in our everyday lives the echo of the world can be felt through the 
questioned singularity of a phenomenon, it is not less true that this requires 
an effort in the thinking of the thing-being:
"Still another way in which truth becomes is the th in ker’s questioning, 
which, as the thinking o f  Being, names Being in its question- 
worthiness
As far as the work of art is concerned, we can say that it motivates the 
thinking o f  Being; by thinking the thing in its having to be a Being that is, it
44 Ibid., p. 187.
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is a setting-into-question of Being and it invites us to come and think the 
thing-being with it. It motivates, it invites, it guides, all these steps are 
present within the work of art. Its mode of being is to motivate the thinking 
of being. Following the guide, we encounter the thing in the space of 
donation of its "there" referring to and indicating the “thereness” of the 
world in which it originated. The work of art worlds the world {es weltet). 
The represented thing takes place in the world, it is a thing of the world, and 
yet, by motivating the evocation of a world, it is also the organising and 
motivating conscience of the world and it is always the world in which it 
itself takes place. It is a response to the world in which and by which it 
happens to be, as well as it is a setting into question of that very world.
As true as this statement can be, we still have not shown how the work of 
art worlds the world no longer seen as the ontical manifestation of such or 
such equipmental environment but as the essence of all worlds, that is the 
worldhood of the world. Even though it is within reach for any of us to 
concentrate on the thingly character of the thing claiming its having to be a 
piece of equipment and therefore relocate it in the systematic complexity of 
the ready-to-hand, yet this exercise in the thinking of the thing in itself only 
allows us to have a conscience of its in-order-to  by casting into light the fo r-  
the-sake of the in-order-to  as well as the equipmental world to which it is 
applied. Nonetheless, the wanting-to-have-a-conscience  o f that which the 
thing is in its totality is not yet reachable since it has only led us to the 
threshold of the worldhood of the world without letting forth its essential 
quality. The task is now to cast the thing in itself into its own light so that
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its having to be the thing that it is not only enlightens the can-be o f  its 
equipmental form, but can direct its field of action on itself. In other words, 
the having-to-be  the thing has to question the having-to-be  itself, the 
purpose of which dwells in the making manifest of the quiddity, the who, the 
essence of the thing as it is at work in the work of art. How does the thing in 
the work of art ask the question of itself and, consequently, how does the 
work of art ask the question of itself? These two “equiprim ordial” 
investigations will now have to be the guide of our reflexion insofar as they 
stand as the essential points of  my encounter with the work of art. In such a 
space of encounter, the work of art truly becomes a fundamental experience 
in which, as we shall see it later, Being opens itself in the scope of its own 
existential question and in which, consequently, I discover my 1 am as a 
Being that is.
4. The Question o f  the World
As we have ju s t  announced it in the former paragraph, the purpose of 
the work of art is to set into work the thing as it is in itself when it stands in 
the light of its own being. It is then no longer concealed by the contingency 
of its factual and ontical can-be. For the thing, to be itself means to find 
oneself in the naked that in the nothing o f  the world. Only then the thing can 
be present as un-concealment. Unconcealment corresponds to the Greek term 
aX rjdsia  which we commonly translate as “truth” . I am not speaking here of 
truth as the non-resistance of A put together with B as in the mode of our
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subjective judgement, but as a structural moment during which the 
phenomenon opens within the light of its being. The thing in its truth opens 
and expresses itself within the light of  its being. The work of art is therefore 
synonymous to the setting into work of an entity in its truth. The work of art 
is also the setting into work of the entity on the mode of the « make see ». 
To see has to be understood in its largest meaning; the one designating the 
whole of our sensible perceptions, the one saying:
“See how that sounds, see how that is scented, see how that tastes, see
how hard that i s ” (SZ 171).
The work of art is fully itself only when it is looked at, when it is 
contemplated, not only because it visually expresses itself, but also, as we 
have seen it, because it sets me into work in its having to be a work. Because 
it is always a setting into work, the work of art does not limit itself to setting 
truth into work for its own good, rather, it is in charge of making us see the 
act of setting truth into work. In that respect, it is an act of casting into light, 
o f making manifest the truth expressed in the represented entity, that is to 
say a making manifest of the thing at work in the work. Truth being the way 
a thing can show itself from itself as it is in itself, the work of art is 
therefore an act of casting into light that which casts itself into light, that is 
the thing in itself, that is truth. The work of art is thus phenomenological in 
the sense that we defined in the course of our first part: it is a « making 
see » of that which shows itself, it is a « making see » of what makes itself 
see.
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We have reached the concept of truth by describing that which was 
already there before our eyes. We stand in the arena of existentialist 
phenomenology. Had we begun our reflection with the elaborate concept of 
truth itself, and had we applied it to the work of art, we would have adopted 
a demonstrative approach in which truth is not something that can be 
revealed because it is self-revealing, but something that is built up as in an 
aesthetic approach. We grasped the concept of truth by describing the thing 
as it shows itself in its having to be a thing in a world. The work of art, 
because it always is a setting into work, makes us see the thing as it lets 
itself see, that is as a thing in a world. It is a setting into question of being a 
thing in a world.
Taking the risk of a heavy formulation, I would say that it is a setting 
into question of the thing and its having to be, a setting into question of its 
conditions of possibility of being able to be in a world, a setting into 
question of my ability to replace it in an ontical world, of my being related 
to the world, of my Being-in-the-world, As we have said before, the work of 
art, being the revelation of the thing in itself, shifts from the "there" of the 
statue to the "there" of the mirror. Asking the question of the world does not 
mean to add an interrogation mark at the end of a sentence speaking of the 
world; the question, or the setting into question, sets fo rth  the world, it 
makes it come in the interrogative light of my question which is directed 
towards its essence, its Being, its expression in truth so that it can reveal it
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as it shows itself from itself as it is in itself. The question of the world has 
to reduce its focus on that which the world is truly.
Only for all these reasons we can allow ourselves to speak of the 
worldhood  of the world, of the essence of the world, that which gathers all 
the things of the world into the whole of the thing-world The thing that is at 
work now enables us to see the world which sets itself into question because 
it is set into work in its equiprimordial truth (therefore the world shows 
itself from itself as it is in itself) with the thing. The world opens as the 
"there" welcoming the work perceived as a factual element which is yet 
always more than factual since it itself opens in the staging and enlightening 
"there" of the thing (that is the work taken as a mere material object). To 
sum up, the world, the work as an artistic production and the work as a 
material object are all three equiprimordial. The realisation and interrogation 
of the world as "there" results from the work of art setting itself into work 
within the thing that it represents; it opens a world in which it has to be as a 
work of art, that is it sets itself into work within the world that it contains; 
the work of art sets up that by which it is itself set up, that is to say the 
world as the conditions of possibility for any factual entity to be. Setting up 
and being set up is a “str i fe”"^  ^ in itself that is witnessed in the essential 
tension between the eternal withdrawing within the impenetrable consistency 
o f  the thing and the boundless magnitude of the world. The thing is earthed 
in the holding of its isness by which the world is maintained in its structural 
amplitude. This strife is actualised by the work of art sitting in the world
45 Ibid., p. 174.
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that issued it and yet carrying it within its frame as a claim to its original 
place and date of  birth. It is thereby worlded  and my gaze both participates 
in and observes this worlding  process by taking the work out of oblivion 
(let’s not forget that a work of art is designed to be looked at and not 
ignored) and therefore giving it a chance to let its world sprout up. When 
realising that the ontical is related to the ontological, like an antique dating 
its own time, we then perceive the inextricable tension between the world 
seen in the thing and the matter being identified, listed and classified within 
a wider structure. The work of art reveals that in which the there is reveals 
itself, that is to say the world that is mine and in which I am. The work of art 
makes me see the revealing being that I was as the conscience of a given 
world and, consequently, reveals me as revealing. In the work of art, I am 
revealing and revealed, 1 am factive and factual, I see the being in the thing, 
and I see the to see of Being set into light.
In the work of art, the whole o f  the world is set up as much as it sets 
itself up. Es gibt is made manifest as an essential foreground which is also 
the background of the work of art. The work of art bets on truth and on truth 
only. It makes see (sets into work) that which makes itself see. Art no longer 
is about the aesthetic value of the representation, or about the genius of the 
trait, it is a bet on truth on which it relies because only truth can set itself 
into work. If  a thing does not express itself in the light of  its truth, that is in 
the light of its being, the work of art dies. The work of art bets, it cannot 
rely either on its status as work of art, or on its aesthetic reality (in the 
traditional meaning o f  the term) to be preserved as a work of art. The artistic
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essence of the work of art does not hold in the work of art which does not 
create in the sense that it builds up. It creates in the sense that it reveals that 
which lets itself revealed, that is that which stands in the light of being, that 
is the whole of the world, its worldhood.
5, To See the Question o f  the World
We have shown how the setting into work of the thing allows the 
setting into question of the world. The "there" of the world has been set forth  
in the "there" of my question. The whole of the world, its worldhood, has 
revealed itself in the light of its Being, it has essentially merged into the 
interrogation mark of my question. In the "there" of my question, the world 
has not yet lost its essence in the now and here of its ontical reality. It has 
shown itself in the truth of its disclosedness, in its Being in which the 
"particular beings , that is the things in their singular plurality including 
us and the work of art, stand.
The thing, as an entity, dwells in the world, it is present-at-hand.
Thus,
"to give a phenomenological description o f  the world will mean to 
exhibit the Being o f  those entities which are present-at-hand within the 
w orld .. .” (SZ63).
46 Ibid., p. 178.
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We have ourselves reached the concept of world and its ontological nature 
by interrogating the factual presence of the thing. In the first part, we have 
cast into light the factual world of the ontical reality of a phenomenon:
"World is used as an ontical concept, and signifies the totality o f  those 
entities which can be present-at-hand within the w or ld” (SZ 65).
We approached this particular mode of donation of the world as a 
phenomenon by making manifest the ontical reality of the thing expressed in 
its thingly character and its equipmentality. Through this second notion 
{readiness to hand), we have reached a second manifestation of the world, 
that is to say the world as the regional ontology of signification: the ready- 
to-hand environment:
"World functions as an ontological term, and signifies the Being o f  those 
entities which we have ju s t  mentioned. And indeed world can become a 
term fo r  any realm which encompasses a multiplicity o f  entities; fo r  
instance, when one talks o f  the world o f  a mathematician, world signifies 
the realm o f  possible objects o f  mathematics” (SZ 65).
This world has been cast into light by the setting into work of the thing in 
itself claiming its having to be within the arena of its signification. The 
thing, in its arrogant singularity, stimulated our gaze which automatically set 
itself into work for the sake of the well-being of the thing: we provided a 
world for the thing to be at home. I found myself as the revealing agent itself
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revealed in the setting into work to which I participated. The work of art, 
functioning in the mode of the make see, made me see my own world as a 
revealing factor actualising the setting into work of truth. Truth happened  in 
the light of my intervention that I happened, to my surprise, to provide. In 
that respect, I let truth happen. Yet, the nature of truth as un-concealment is, 
as the word shows it, not to conceal itself and therefore to show itself 
according to its mode of donation. The conditions of possibility for truth to 
show itself as that which shows itself from itself as it is in itself therefore 
lies in the conditions of possibility for the regarding/looking/watching object 
to witness the happening of truth as a spontaneous setting into work. For that 
matter, the revealing object, that is the subject enabling the make see to be 
seen, has to stand in the scope of its own act of seeing. In other words, its 
facticity has to perceive itself in its factuality. Not only do we realise at first 
glance that the subject and object terminology has no relevance as far as the 
elucidation of truth and its setting into work and question are concerned, but 
we also grasp the idea that the work of art puts us into the presence of the 
conditions of possibility for anything to happen, including the essential 
"there" of the world. The work of art highlights the essential source of Being 
by casting into light the conditions of possibility of the setting into work of 
the world that I provide. Using a Heideggerian language, the work of art 
proposes a restoration of the hermeneutics o f  facticity.
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6, The Restoration o f  the Hermeneutics o f  Facticity
The Hermeneutics of  facticity does not have any signification if  not in 
its name. It is an empty support rising in each of its utterances. To say its 
name is in itself an explicit path towards its implicit recall.
Because the world is always and already presupposed within the whole 
of our considerations, the understanding of this world can only be a 
recognition. Our method is, for that purpose, descriptive. It does not have 
the presumption of re-inventing the world. Its merit is at least first to grow 
aware of this fact and second to explain why it has to be so. It is a 
recognition, a reconnaissance, that is, a re-birth. The French word is here 
particularly noteworthy; its current understanding leaves aside its 
etymological composition expressing the idea of being born with again.
Its ambiguous grammatical position in a sentence does not unveil the 
doubt as far as the what and the who. The Hermeneutics of facticity as a 
recognition has to be perceived in the light of the French understanding of 
the term. In that sense, our question takes all its importance since it appears 
as the crystallisation of the ontological research already opened in the 
former paragraphs. Indeed, truth stands as that which shows itself from itself 
and yet, its ontological importance escapes our thinking because Western 
philosophy never managed to perceive it first in its being there and second in 
its consistency. A hermeneutic reading of the setting into work of art 
therefore presents a twofold interest; the presentation of truth, its
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"establishment” (as we have already shown it) and its re-presentation in its 
"sustained”"^  ^ disclosedness.
In Sein und Zeit, Facticity consists in the faculty for an entity to let 
another entity happen. It is the setting into fact of a phenomenon. This is 
only possible under the condition of an organising consciousness dividing 
the world into categories of signification in which the thing is granted a 
meaning. If a thing is in its having to be a piece of equipment, it then can 
only be as such in the categorial "there" that my spatializing consciousness 
organised for it. Things happen within the revealing "there" of my 
preoccupation. In that sense, the world is understood as the comprehensive 
horizon of my own concern. I am the consciousness of the world in which I 
always stand. A hermeneutics of this facticity therefore proposes a reading 
of the fact that I always am the "there" of my preoccupations in which the 
targeted thing is brought forth. It then deals with an elaboration of the 
conditions of possibility for the thereness of the "there" to be at all:
"World can be understood in another ontical sense - not, however, as 
those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be 
encountered within-the-world, but rather as that "wherein” a factical  
Dasein as such can be said to live. World has here a pre-ontological 
existentiel signification. Here again there are different possibilities: 
world may stand fo r  the public we-world, or o n e ‘s own closest 
(domestic) environm ent” (SZ 65).
47 Ibid., p. 186.
86
Recognition o f the There
In Sein und Zeit, the hermeneutics of facticity then comes back to a 
reading of Dasein’s having to be Dasein. Dasein bears a central position in 
the light of which all the particular beings that are converge in a sense of 
Being. For that matter, the concept of fundamental ontology has to go 
through the various stages of existential analytics. Sein und Zeit is a 
phenomenological journey from existential analytics to fundamental 
ontology: "Dasein is in the tru th”{SZ  221). The Origin o f  the Work o f  A r f  ^  
originality lies in the change of directionality that it operates; Dasein, that is 
to say ourselves, no longer bears this central position since it no longer has 
the monopoly of truth. Truth has to be revealed in the entirety of that which 
is, in the whole of es gibt  which is no longer seen through Dasein’s 
articulating consciousness. In The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, truth escapes 
Dasein even though it still needs its eyes in order to disclose itself within its 
unconcealment:
"With all our correct representations we would get nowhere, we could  
not even presuppose that there already is manifest something to which we 
can conform ourselves, unless the unconcealment o f  beings had already 
exposed us to, p laced  us in that cleared realm in which every being 
stands fo r  us and from  which it withdraws .
The work of art then looks after the exposition of the unconcealment of 
beings. It is a make see that reveals that which already makes itself see in its 
unconcealment. It is a revelatory space in which things in their truth come to
48 Ibid., p. 177.
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show themselves to us, not for them to be granted a signification but for us 
to conform to them. We conform ourselves to the realm of factuality by 
witnessing in the work of art the happening  o f  our "there" in truth and its 
mode of donation in truth. Truth stands both in its disclosedness and in the 
revelation of its disclosedness:
"The actuality o f  the work has been defined by that which is at work in 
the work, by the happening o f  truth .
As a consequence, the work of art only has a "work-being”^  ^ in the 
recognition of the strife (the withdrawal of the thing within itself and the 
world in its magnitude) as such. Only the making manifest o f their 
equiprimordiality enables the actualisation of the strife. In that respect,
"the attempt to define the work-being o f  the work purely in terms o f  the 
work o f  art proves to be unfeasible”^ (
An analysis of the hermeneutics of facticity therefore no longer shows, as 
in Sein und Zeit, the revealing primacy of the ontico-ontological nature of 
Dasein, but the having to be at work of truth:
"Because it is in the essence o f  truth to establish itse lf within beings, in 
order thus f irs t  to become truth, the impulse toward the work lies in the
Ibid., p. 182. 
Ibid., p. 183. 
Ibid., p. 183.
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essence o f  truth as one o f  tru th ’s possible distinctive possibilities, by 
which it can itse lf occur as being in the midst o f  beings
Truth stands in the moment when it stages its revealing act, in the making 
see of that which can be seen, and sets itself up as the conditions of 
possibility for the hermeneutics of facticity to be. The hermeneutics of 
facticity serves the absolute purpose of truth. If it happens to be revealing, 
and if  it happens to maintain its revealing gaze in its revealing space, it is 
for ever to be revealed in its factuality:
"The establishing o f  truth in the work is the bringing forth  o f  a being  
such as never was before and will never come to be again
Truth constitutes its own and impulsive attraction to the hermeneutics of 
facticity seen as the compulsory passage towards the setting into work in the 
work of art. As a passage, a mediation, the hermeneutics of facticity only 
works as the revealing agent of its revealed factor. A gigantic step has thus 
been made in the transition between Sein und Zeit and The Origin o f  the 
Work o f  Art since it is through the casting into light of the hermeneutics of 
facticity in the essay that we come to a point of realisation not only of the 
fundamentalisation of fundamental ontology, but also of the achievement of 
phenomenology as a making manifest of the space of encounter between the 
phenomenon and itself. In the course of the first part, we defined the work of 
art as a fundamental experience in which Being coheres with itself in the
Ibid., p. 187. 
Ibid., p. 187.
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"there" of my question. This only takes its full meaning in the understanding 
of the hermeneutics of facticity as, maybe, a given organ no longer 
belonging to its user. I mean by that that I am free to set my eyes in contact 
with anything that stands in the field of my preoccupation but, ultimately, 
my eyes are an organ setting itself on what is already given, including 
themselves. Consequently, through the work of art, my eyes perceive 
themselves in their factual possibility. This statement therefore sets forth the 
necessity for ontology and phenomenology to be a philosophy of mediation 
and transition.
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The Question of Existence
1, The Strife, or the E ssentia l Sphere o f  Phenom enology
The strife, being at work in the work of art, ex-poses itself. It shows 
itself from itself as it is in itself in the work of art. The mode of being of the 
work of art, the make see, therefore has to preserve the essence of that which 
it represents. Since to represent means to set back into presence, then it has 
to care about the accuracy of the representation for the object of its concern 
not to be insulted. It is a fact that in the work of art, that which is at work is 
an issue for it. As a representation, it has to assure the security of the 
represented entity’s truth.
Here lies the core of phenomenology. In that respect, it parts from 
either Realistic philosophy or Idealist philosophy. The former was aiming at 
reaching an objective sphere of knowledge based on our senses and the latter 
elaborated the conditions of possibility of the same knowledge without 
leaving the subjective sphere. Phenomenology dwells in the point of 
coherence between the two spheres. For that matter, it proposes to cast into 
light the modes of donation of the reality before our eyes in order to cast 
into light the why and the how of our modes of understanding. As it is said 
in The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, the disclosedness of being as it shows itself
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from itself constitutes that to which our cognitive mode conforms. With 
Heideggerian phenomenology, we no longer find ourselves in a position in 
which knowledge is based on the equation value = validity of my intuitive 
conceptualisation, that is the validity of my judgement related to a formerly 
distant object. When traditional philosophy based the concept of cognition 
on the correlation of A and B and therefore on the non-resistance for these 
two elements to be put together, phenomenology, on the other hand, poses 
knowledge as the immediate identification of that which is seen. Everything 
that is seen or not seen is in itself a phenomenon that gives itself in its 
possibility or non-possibility of giving itself. But the physical non­
possibility of a phenomenon does not project it in the nothingness of non­
existence, rather it is doomed to be the evident expression of an apparent 
tension, a strife, calling upon our witnessing gaze which recognises it in its 
very tension. In other words, truth is no longer a subjective appreciation of a 
judgement's accuracy but, rather, it stands as the presentation of the thing-in- 
itself. Heidegger operates a shift from truth as adequacy to truth as evidence, 
as Husserl had done it before him in the sixth Logical Investigation. 
Knowledge therefore takes a radically different connotation. It no longer 
necessitates the comparison between two predicates enabling the realisation 
of their reciprocal adequacy but it stands in and as the revelation of the 
entity itself. A statement is now true inasmuch as it discovers, reveals and 
makes see an entity in its sense of belonging to itself. Husserl called this 
phenomenon the "ideal adequation"  behind which Heidegger perceived his 
notion of the hidden truth.
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It is of course this notion that we have tried to cast into light through 
the phenomenon of the work of art. We have shown how it enabled the 
identification of the thing-in-itself therefore perceived in its absence of 
concealment, that is to say in its truth. Let us recall that truth in Greek was 
aletheia, a-concealment. We have also stressed the fact that the thing, as it is 
in truth, shows itself from itself as it is in itself and that it therefore is a 
necessity for the truth of this entity to make itself manifest. Truth can only 
appear as such if  it precisely appears. Hence, the work of art, by presenting 
the thing as it is in truth shows that which already shows itself. The work of 
art is responsible for truth originating outside its frame and yet being fully 
itself within the frame only. Indeed the work of art, functioning as a make 
see, enables the visualisation and the realisation of that which needs to be 
visualised for it to be realised. By considering the passage from truth as 
adequacy to truth as a-concealment, we have also cast into light truth as an 
originary and discovering agent which in the work of art discovers itself in 
its having to be at work. We now guess why Heidegger is so closely 
interested in the work of art as far as his investigation about ontology is 
concerned. Let us quote him again ; his path is "a travel along 
phenomenology down to the thinking o f  Being", The work of art's function is 
to be re-searched in the visual identification of truth. In other words, the 
work of art is a functional activity whose original principle is to be found 
elsewhere. The work of art expresses itself in the name of truth.
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2. Truth Echoing Within I ts e lf
These considerations therefore lead us to the understanding of the 
work of art as a medium, a transient illumination of truth communicating 
with itself. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger mentions many a time that our gaze 
is fully absorbed by the object of its preoccupations, and that it is always 
lost in the supports of its contemplation which are a constant reality for any 
of us. We are always imprisoned within the frame of the world's reality: 
"When Dasein directs i tse lf  towards something and grasps it, it does not 
somehow f irs t  get out o f  an inner sphere in which it has been proximally  
encapsulated, but its primary kind o f  Being is such that it is always outside 
alongside entities which it encounters and which belong to a world already 
discovered" (SZ 62). This quotation expresses the idea that the whole of my 
preoccupations is always rooted within a context from which I cannot 
escape. I constantly evolve inside and through a personal cultural 
background which is itself conditioned by a historical whole. I always am 
the organising consciousness of this horizon of which I am myself an 
element. We have previously developed this idea with the concept of 
equipmental world evoked by the thing in itself claiming its belonging to 
that world. The thing takes its meaning within its own world of signification 
to which it belongs and from which it comes. It is through the identification 
of the thing deprived from its usefulness that it expressed itself in the light 
of the entirety of its configurations. In that respect, the work of art puts us 
into the essential presence of the world, of the worldhood of the world, and 
reveals itself both as a statue and a mirror of this non-apparent phenomenon
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which we have cast into light. We have then seen how the work of art is 
itself sustained within the duality of that which it sets forth, that is to say the 
thing in itself withdrawn within the immanent presence of its essence, and 
the magnitude of the world to which it is itself submitted. It is within this 
constant tension, that is to say this constant strife, that the work of art both 
gives life to its function, that is to say to set up an object and its world, and 
to its nature, that is providing the functional frame that will stand as a 
receptacle for the happening of the thing in truth. This tension has to be seen 
as the dwelling in which truth echoes and shows itself as the conscious 
projection of its own light onto that which it frames. In this moment of 
consummation, the work of art digs in between the two layers that it brings 
forth, one being the ontological ground on which the notion of happening 
comes to be possible, the other being the surface of the phenomenon being 
actively framed and essentially at work in the existence of its "there". To put 
it differently, the work of art dissociates from itself by providing both a 
dwelling and a dweller and by being alternatively being one or the other; it 
fundamentally appears as an intermediary between two layers that it itself 
provides, as the eye of the spectator which travels and commutes within that 
space and, there, hears the work of art echo with itself. It is essentially 
within this depth that the work of art fully becomes itself. It reaches this 
moment of fulfilment when its function expresses the purpose of its nature, 
that is to say when the two come to a matching point letting forth the work 
of art’s Being in the process of being.
Again, it appears to us that the distinction between the subject and the 
object is totally inadequate since the work of art, expressing itself in the
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name of truth, enables the visualisation and therefore the actualisation of 
that which is itself the subject of its own self-legitimation 
(Selbstausweisung) and therefore the condition of possibility of its own 
being there. For that reason, a phenomenological analysis of the work of art 
does not ask about the artist and thus eradicates the traditional concept of 
representation justifying the aesthetic and ethic theories usually applied to 
art.
That which is at work in the work of art is truth as self-presentation. It 
is the reflective relation of belonging to an historical and cultural 
background that the work of art expresses. In that sense, it does not ask 
about the artist as the one who gave a life to the work of art, but, rather, it 
mirrors the existential modes of living of all those who have to do with it, 
and that is indifferently the artist and the spectator no longer being 
perceived as such but being fundamentally considered as Dasein. Yet this is 
merely possible because the work of art bears within itself the capacity, as 
well as the obligation, to reset its own presence within the world that it 
worlds, that it stages as an articulated system, a horizonal scheme enabling 
Dasein to recognise itself as the organising and comprising entity that it 
belongs to him to be. The work of art is in its essence a work articulating 
that which is already essentially articulated by it and shows itself as such in 
it: "La composante figurative de la religion n'est pas seulement tirée en 
avant par le moment spécula tif  de la philosophie, elle renvoie en arrière 
d'elle même à toutes les configurations (Gestalten) culturelles qui la 
précèdent sur le parcours de l'esprit humain allant de la nature à la culture
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et de la culture à Vautopresentation de l'absolu. We are therefore not 
dealing with a representation but indeed with a presentation, a figuring of 
truth showing the whole of es gibt in its articulating and articulated mode: 
"True, there lies hidden in nature a rift-design, a measure and a boundary  
and, tied to it, a capacity fo r  bringing forth  - that is, art. But it is equally 
certain that this art hidden in nature becomes manifest only through the 
work, because it lies originally in the work"^^. The work of art turns out to 
be a space in between holding within its frame the essence of a world from 
which it cannot escape lest it should lose its signification and its meaning. 
In other words, the work of art functions as a revealing passage between the 
here and there of a world which, through the signification that it grants to all 
that constitutes it, is essentially gathered within the thing precisely deprived 
of its significant world. The whole of a world can only be fully present in 
total absence which expresses itself as the absence of a whole and not a 
merely partial one. For that reason, the totality of the whole figures itself in 
its being essentially Vorhandenheit. Because it is essentially presentation 
and not representation, truth can be itself since it is respected in its mode of 
donation which precisely consists in its being present in the whole and the 
nothing of the world. Truth is then "preserved"^^ in the possible integrality 
of all the different choices since none of them is ontically and empirically 
chosen. The difference between figuring and representing is here crucial for 
our analysis of the work of art. With Paul Ricoeur, we understand figuring
^"^Ricoeur Paul, « Aux fi'ontières de la philosophie », Lectures 3, Ed. Seuil, (La couleur des idées, 1992) p. 
43.
"%id, p. 195. 
p. 191.
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(Vorstellung) in its opposing parity to conceptualisation {Begriff}^^. To 
conceptualize implies an engagement along a certain ontical path which is 
chosen among others. It presupposes the presence of a previous image of an 
object held in the distance of non-understanding. Such a conception implies 
truth as a commuting apparatus enabling the subject to fill in the gap in- 
between. Through the adequation between the object and the related 
judgement, the alienating distance is broken because the object is held within 
our cognitive and therefore subjective equipment. This space of justification 
of the judgement, in which the object stands and allows an experience based 
on the equation value = validity, is, as far as Husserl is concerned, called 
“ intuition” . Nevertheless, the Husserlian intuition, which functions on the 
mode of truth as adequation, is based on sensible perception. It is a matter of 
seeing that which is before our eyes: "Zu den Sachen selbst"^^. Husserl's 
philosophy keeps the thing away from any theoretical construction and 
consequently settles the whole of knowledge on experience (judgement plus 
intuition), that is on the thing given in the intuition; "Toute intuition 
donatrice originaire est une source de droit pour la connaissance; tout ce 
qui s'offre à nous dans l'intuition de façon originaire (dans sa réalité 
corporelle pour ainsi dire) doit être simplement reçu pour ce qu'il se donne, 
mais sans non plus outrepasser les limites dans lesquelles il se donne 
a l o r s In Ideen, a come back to positivism is operated and behind truth as 
equation is hidden and announced truth as unconcealment, that is to say truth 
as aletheia. Here is where Heidegger's philosophy begins, that is in the
57Ricoeur Paul, « Aux frontières de la philosophie », Lectures 3, Ed. Seuil, (La couleur des idées, 1992) p. 
41.
^^Husserl Edmund, Ideen, 24.
^^Husserl Edmund, Ideen, 24.
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consideration of truth as already presupposed in its logical adequacy. For 
him, the notion of conceptualisation rests on the presence of figuring 
perceived as self-legitimate and self-represented. It stands as that which is 
always pre-given and pre-perceived and that on which a conceptual re­
presentation can take place. In that sense, Heidegger is a typical parricidal 
philosopher. By perceiving truth as an originary revealing agent, the 
Husserlian theory of the doubt becomes radically inadequate inasmuch as the 
existence of the world is no longer questioned. The task for him is to cast 
into light our belonging to this world not in order to prove its existence but 
in order to figure out how to understand it, how to grasp the ontological 
enigma dwelling in the fact that it is always and already there. We have seen 
how the world and its worldhood are immediately present in our thinking 
being, also we have cast into light the work of art as a revelatory mediation 
between truth and itself, as an eye-witness of the world and an articulated 
system in which all that is stands in the open of its articulating being.
i .  Facticity Within F  actuality
The artwork is not about "telling a story"  (SZ 6), and it should no 
longer be understood only as the personal expression of an aesthetic trace 
which, because it was born in the workshop of the artist, simply belongs to 
the universe of the artist. Through the artist it is the more general exposition 
of a cultural background that comes to our conscience. The work of art, in 
that respect, functions, as already mentioned, as a "wanting-to~have-
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conscience” of the essential conditions of possibility by which it is 
constituted. Within itself stands its Being, and within itself stands the 
expression of its Being. The work of art, because it is exclusively about 
presentation and figuring, is therefore exclusively about expression through 
which the essence becomes apparent in its having to exist. The purpose of 
ontological phenomenology has to pierce through the artwork's aesthetic 
manifestation which is no longer perceived as the original expression of an 
artistic talent but as the expression of an origin which it carries within itself. 
The work of art is automatically devitalised, de-animated for the 
fundamental sake of a primary origin which is at work in the work of art. 
The aesthetic dimension appears as a delivery system conveying the Being of 
its ontical "there", that is the condition of possibility for its empirical 
realisation to happen. In other words, the work of art makes manifest its 
conditions of possibility, it questions them, that is to say that it projects into 
the light of its "work-being" its having to be a work. It is responsible for its 
Being about which it always is conscious since, through its what and its how, 
that which it shows is the why and the who that it is. In that sense, the work 
of art engages in a dialogue with itself. It puts itself into a dialogical 
perspective in which it encounters itself and in which it can freely see that to 
which it is doomed to be doing as a work of art, that is to say its having to 
show, to understand and to see its Being. As already stated above, the work 
of art is factive insofar as it factuality is an issue for itself. It questions its 
factuality, that is its being there, its being preoccupied by its own conditions 
of possibility of being a work of art. It questions itself, it sets itself into 
question because it is its own condition of possibility of  its existence. By
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questioning its existence (that is to say by showing how it shows itself as a 
work of art, by making see how it can be seen) the work of art previously 
appeared to us as self-presentation and self-legitimation . It gives itself as a 
presence within its frame as well as it frames that which it gives; it is both 
an in and an around, it is essentially the constant framing of the un- 
framable, a perpetual tension between an inside-out and an outside-in 
relationship. The work of art welcomes us in its epiphany, it makes us see 
and therefore dwell within the "there" of the whole of the world, the whole 
of fundamental truth, gathered inside a perspectival frame. Truth is figured 
within a concentrating frame which spontaneously evaporates in the absolute 
scope of that which it presents. In that sense, the work of art celebrates the 
apology as well as the death of the frame, both walking hand in hand along 
the phenomenological path down to the thinking of Being. To see Being 
means to see it as it shows itself, that is to say as "the most universal and the 
emptiest concepts"  (SZ 1), the concept whose definition has to be relocated 
within the scope of the indefinable. To define Being comes back to the 
recognition of its resistance to any attempt to define it since any definition, 
perceived as a being that is, would automatically fall back into the always 
wider realm of that which it defines. To have a definition of Being would 
always mean not to have one. The work of art, aiming at fundamental 
ontology, that is to say at the presentation of Being as an expression of 
itself, has to preserve its absolute integrity, its necessary presence in the 
"naked that in the nothing o f  the world". A definition of Being would 
therefore require the existence of a meta-language which, because it would 
exist, could never be one. Heidegger must be understood in that sense when,
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in the Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, he asserts that "Each answer remains in 
fo rce  as an answer only as long as it is rooted in questioning."^^. In the 
essay, the work of art presents itself as "a becoming and a happening o f  
truth", an institution and a constitution (Ge-stell) o f truth. Truth "is to be 
thought in terms o f  the particular placing and enframing as which the work 
occurs when it sets i tse lf  up and sets itse lf forth"^"^. To show Truth by the 
means of the phenomenological method implies the necessity to show it as it 
itself shows itself. Therefore, to bring truth to that which it essentially is, 
that is un-concealment, implies to show it in the light of  its having to be 
concealed. If truth is truth only when it is an expression of Being, that is to 
say when it is Being in its essential truth (a-concealment), then truth must be 
preserved in its being "the most universal and hence indefinable concept" 
(SZ 2). "Truth is un~truth, insofar as there belongs to it the reservoir o f  the 
not-yet-revealed"^^. Truth bears in itself the force of a question since it 
preserves within itself the reservoir o f  the not-yet-revealed  answers. To 
respond to Being in its having to be the whole that it always is means to 
celebrate it in the all and the nothing of the question: "L'idée d'ouverture 
signifie que les multiples singularités philosophiques -Platon, Descartes, 
Spinoza- sont a priori accessibles l'une à l'autre, que tout dialogue est 
possible a-priori, parce que l'être est cet acte qui, précédant et fondant toute 
possibilité de questionner, fonde  la mutualité des intentions philosophiques  
les p lus singulières. C'est une ouverture, cette clairière, ce lumen naturale, 
que l'imagination naïve projette dans les Champs-Élysées où les dialogues
^%id., p. 195. 
^% id.,p. 189. 
^hbid.,p. 185.
102
The Question of Existence
des morts sont possibles. Aux Champs-Élysées tous les philosophes sont 
contemporains et toutes les communications réversibles: Platon peut
répondre à Descartes son cadet; les Champs-Élysées f iguren t l'ouverture 
préalable à l'histoire et qui rend possible tout dialogue dans le temps. Alors  
la pluralité n'est pas la réalité dernière... L'être de toute question ouvre 
originairement chacun à chacun et fonde  la vérité historique et polémique de 
la communication"^^. The plurality of that which can be seen or that which 
can be said is not ultimate. Rather it always indicates a foundational 
principle which is common to all that is empirically present. Phenomenology 
turns out to be a philosophy responding to presence itself. As we have seen 
in the introductory chapters of our reflection, the thing has to be approached 
in its singularity, in the there of its presence cut from all ties interfering with 
it in the articulation of its signification. Then, the thing is perceived as that 
which it is only for itself, as the thing in itself. It stops being the sign or the 
reference that it always has to be in a meaningful context, which means that 
it is no longer read as the element serving the purpose of a larger and non- 
apparent phenomenon (for instance, the shoes being associated to the walk), 
but it is seen as that which it shows from itself and in itself. The as-structure 
{als-Struktur SZ 143) no longer connects the thing to something else 
according to the rules of the equipmental in-order-to, but it connects it to 
itself and penetrates the withdrawal of its intimacy. The thing can then be 
freed from the edifice of usefulness of which it only is a constitutive 
element. The plurality of  its « can-be » is gathered within the singularity of 
its having-to-be the thing that it is in itself. In other words, it is considered 
in the "there" of its individual presence.
^^Ricoeur Paul, Histoire et Vérité, troisième édition du Seuil, collection Esprit / Seuil, p. 59.
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The work of art maintains the thing in the entirety of its not-yet- 
revealed  signification. The thing is no longer justified by the equipmental 
whole of which it is part but it is reduced to that which it shows as itself in 
itself. That which it shows in itself is always the necessity to exist within the 
world where it takes place, where it takes its organic place. It will always 
take a different place according to that which is aimed in the it. As for the 
shoes, they can be either the shoes for the walk or the shoes for the labour in 
the field. In both cases, the shoes will show themselves in the light of their 
respective usefulness. They will be perceived as that which they are made 
for and, in most cases, will be forgotten as shoes by the revealing light of  the 
project in question. Effectively, the shoes for the walk will immediately be 
seen as appropriate or as inappropriate for such or such terrain or surface. 
The confection of the shoes implies for the designer to take into account all 
the various parameters of the walk; as for the shoes, they will have to 
respond to these external criteria and their success will depend on their 
ability to fuse into their environments, that is to say their ability not to resist 
it. The roughness of the leather as well as the hostility of the ground both 
have to disappear within the comfort and the security of the shoes. The shoes 
have to make themselves forgotten in the absence of sensation, the shoes 
have to disappear as shoes. A child can joyfully recall the presence of his 
new shoes every fifty yards because they fit him so well that he forgets about 
them. They can periodically warm up his heart because they do not hurt his 
feet. Through this instance, we need to see that the shoes were in fact born in 
the mountains, or in the forest, depending on their usefulness. They might 
have been made in the workshop of the designer, but it is quite unlikely that
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the designer himself was body and soul in his workshop when he was 
working on them. Rather, he was projected in the "there" of his own 
experience of the walk, that is to say in the holes, the bumps, the gravel, in 
all that could previously resist his progression and that the not-yet-revealed  
shoes have to overcome. It is always in the light of their environment that 
shoes can find a signification; the shoes are never where we empirically see 
them but always in the "there" where they ask to be projected. We see them 
in the why of their being there, we understand them as the why their being 
there. In other words, we never leave the shoes alone, we always perceive 
them in their having to exist, in their having to be part of a larger edifice in 
which they are projected. To see the shoes always implies understanding 
them as such or such piece of equipment: "Understanding o f  Being has 
already been taken fo r  granted in projecting upon possibilities"  (SZ 148). 
For Heidegger, to see is already to understand and the to see is ruled by the 
consistency of the as-structure: "That which is disclosed in understanding - 
that which is understood - is already accessible in such a way that its as 
which can be made to stand out explicitly". (SZ 149).
To see the shoes in themselves therefore means to understand them as 
that which they are in themselves as they show themselves. To see the shoes 
in their singularity means to understand them as if  they did not have any 
usefulness, as if  they did not belong to any environment but their own, as if 
they exclusively belonged to themselves. The light of the as-structure is no 
longer projected on the in-order-to of its usefulness but on the thing in 
question: "That which has been circumspectively taken apart with regard to 
its in-order-to, and taken apart as such - that which is explicitly understood
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“ has the structure o f  som ething as som ething"  (SZ 149). This quotation 
shows how the notion of as-structure  is part and parcel of the thing. To see 
the thing in itself does not mean to dispossess it from that which precisely 
enables it to behave like a thing. Rather, to see the thing in the entirety of its 
constitution also means to perceive it in the light of the whole o f its 
environment. Because the thing is always connected to something else, its 
essential definition has to reflect the whole to which it might always be 
connected. In that case, the thing is no longer ontically projected in another 
ontical edifice but it is projected in the whole of the possibilities which 
belongs to itself and to itself only. Hence, the as-structure  does not appear 
as an external agent to which the thing submits, but it stands as an intrinsic 
quality of the thing which, as soon as it is, is as (including as itself). The 
thing becomes itself: it is projected into the whole of its possibilities as if  it 
was projected into another ontical environment, and it exists by dwelling 
within itself. In other words, the thing encounters itself in the space of 
projection which essentially belongs to itself. The perceived entirety of the 
thing swallows up all and each of the various ontical m anifestation suddenly 
reduced to a possibility which becomes the factual reality of the phenomenon 
itself. This possibility preserves within itself the unconsumed, the un­
dissipated strength of the not-yet-revealed  and therefore o f the always yet 
having to be. The ontical reality is then submerged by this revealed and 
revealing essential entity which appears as the expression of its Being:
"And ye t - beyond beings, not away from  them but before them, there 
is still something else that happens. In the midst o f  beings as a whole an 
open place occurs. There is a clearing. Thought o f  in reference to beings,
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this clearing is more in being than are beings. This open centre is therefore 
not surrounded by beings; rather, the clearing centre itse lf encircles all that 
is, as does the nothing, which we scarcely know.
4, Truth as Self-Presentation
The quotation at the end o f the last paragraph stages the happening of 
truth, that is to say that it describes the disclosedness o f  Being  setting itself 
into work through the work o f art which maintains truth in its revelatory 
presence. As 1 have showed it earlier on, the work of art is prim arily that to 
which I can respond inasm uch as it originates in a world, inasmuch as it 
responds to a world no longer seen as the sum of all the entities but 
perceived as a system articulated by a consciousness called Being-in-the- 
world of Dasein. The work of art responds to that consciousness for the 
simple reason that it was born in that world and was therefore an expression 
of that consciousness. The work o f art took its form in a cultural horizon, in 
a referential context, in the worldhood of the world. It took its form in it but 
also was in-formed by it. The work of art worlds the world because it carries 
in itself the sense of Being, the essential source o f the Being-in-contact- 
with. The work o f art, in that respect, works both as a statue and a m irror; it 
is an entity brought forth by its world and a reflection of this world. It 
functions as the presentation of the thing in the world as well as the whole of 
the world in the thing. It stages this constant tension between the two, the
64 Ibid., p. 178.
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strife between the multiple and the one. The work of art in its epiphany calls 
into question the passage from the thing within the world to the thing 
containing the world as an infinite field of possibility. This passage is cast 
into light in the open of the work of art which can present it inasmuch as it is 
itself present in this passage: it comes to light in a world which it contains 
and maintains within itself. The work of art always stands and holds both 
within the thing in itself which it presents and the world in which it presents 
itself as itself: "But concealment, though o f  another sort, to be sure, at the 
same time also occurs within what is cleared. One being places itse lf in fro n t 
o f  another being, the one helps to hide the other, the form er obscures the 
latter, a few  obstruct many, one denies all. Here concealment is not sim ple 
refusal. Rather, a being appears, but presents itse lf as other than it is. By 
operating a perpetual return upon itself, a being is perpetually more the 
being that it has to be in the signification of its contextual environment. The 
thing does not only evoke the world in its clustering externality but it truly 
holds it in its thingly constitution. In the thing in itself holds all that 
constitutes it as a thing, that is to say its the world from which it can 
extirpate its matter-form structure^ its "substance and accidents its 
origin, its signification, in brief, its quiddity, its essence. The thing as it is 
shown in The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, that is the thing as it is in itself, 
"depends on nothing external fo r  its intelligibility"^^. It is at work in the 
work of art, it shows itself in the light of truth which is placed and framed in 
the work. The work of art, in its ontical reality, is entirely thrown into its
p. 179. 
p. 149.
^^Gerald L. Bmns, Heidegger's Estrangements: Language Truth and Poetry in the Later Writings, New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press, p. 37.
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having to be a work, that is a presentation of truth, a figuring of Being as an 
expression of itself. The work of art which is there before our eyes is then 
perceived as a work o f art, it withdraws within its having to be a work, 
w ithin its having to let truth figure itself in the totality of its realm. 
Functioning on the mode of the make see, it enables the visualisation of the 
passage from the ontical to the ontological in which that which is em pirically 
there before our eyes is suddenly cast into the light o f its ontological 
essence. This passage turns out to be what Heidegger calls the "happening” 
of truth in which the work of art, as a being that is, happens in its work- 
being. What I mean by that is that the work of art can only be itself fully 
with regard to its ontological epiphany. It revisits the fundamental presence 
of Being (which sets itself into presence in the artwork) in which all that is 
has to dwell under its most general and universal form and, of course, this 
includes the work o f art as well. In order for it to be considered as such, the 
work of art m ust sacrifice its ontical reality for the sake of the ontological 
truth that it aims at revealing. It projects truth within the heart of its Being 
which can only welcome it because, as a being that is. Being already 
constitutes it: "But truth does not exist in itse lf beforehand, somewhere 
among the stars, only subsequently to descend elsewhere among beings. This 
is impossible fo r  the reason alone that it is after all only the openness o f  
beings that fir s t  affords the possib ility  o f  a somewhere and o f  sites f i l le d  by 
present beings. Clearing o f  openness and establishm ent in the open region 
belong together. They are the same single essence o f  the happening o f  
truth"^^. The work of art is the mediation between Being in the work and 
Being at work in the work. It presents itself as the revealing ontical support
68Ibid., p. 186.
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in which Being can recognise itself w ithin itself, in which Being can respond 
to its presence as an expression of itself. For that m atter, the work of art 
withdraws within the whole of expression (and that includes the artistic 
expression), it celebrates the rising of Being which also means its own carnal 
sacrifice in which it w itnesses its own condition of possibility, that is Being 
as its own possibility o f being. In that sense, the work o f art engages into a 
dialogical tension with itself. It discovers itself in its being thrown into the 
world that it presents, it is turned towards the world that it is itself, it deals 
(Umgang: SZ 73) with itself. The work o f art is an issue for itself. Because 
the work of art is a revealing agent functioning on the mode of the make see, 
it also has the capacity to relocate itself within the light of its revealing 
scope and to be revealed as such. It is itself that from which and by which it 
can be seen as a work of art. It places and frames the thing in itself which, to 
be seen as such, constantly refers to its having to be placed and framed. The 
work of art finds its essential truth in the thing that it figures and the thing 
remains the thing that it is in the revealing function (the epiphany) o f the 
placing and framing work of art in which it can be and be kept at work. 
Again, "Art then is a becoming and happening o f  truth"^^. Both express the 
complementarity of their respective modes of being: truth is self­
presentation and the work of art is presentation. In more technical terms, the 
work of art has to be conceived as a factor participating in the possibility for 
the thing to be the thing that it has to be. Indeed, by m aintaining the thing 
within its frame, it preserves and retains it in the privileged position of being 
shown and therefore seen. The work of art constantly sends us back to what 
is framed. It sees to it that the thing that it presents does not fall into
"^^Ibid.,p. 196.
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oblivion. It always is the preserver  of the thing which reveals it as a work of 
art. It preserves by keeping the thing in the open of its Being, it is that which 
indicates to us that the thing has to be read as the thing that it is. By the 
simple act of placing and framing, the work of art works as a guideline, a 
recipe conducting us along the path o f the phenomenon down to the thinking 
of its Being. It is part and parcel of the thing inasmuch as it is the as- 
structure  that the thing needs for it to be a thing. For a thing to be a thing, it 
always has to project itself among a specific field of possibilities by which it 
confirms its welcomed presence as this thing and not another one. In the case 
of the work of art, the thing can be read as a thing in itself because its 
projection is constantly guided by the fact that it is placed and framed and, 
therefore, by the fact that it cannot escape this frame that constitutes it. To 
frame a thing means to show it in the lim it of its own boundaries in which it 
can freely exist within itself. W ithout the frame, the thing would evaporate 
into its disparate environm ent in which it would surely be forgotten. The 
frame is the condition of possibility for the thing not to be forgotten, that is 
to say for the thing to be read as a thing. The work of art must be seen as 
Als-Struktur, it is the reason why a thing can be read only as the thing that it 
is.
Are we then trespassing the rules imposed by our method which, for 
the sake of the respect o f the thing, has to be exclusively descriptive? How 
can the work of art show the thing as it shows itself from itself and yet be 
essentially functioning on the mode of the as-structurel Indeed, the as- 
structure  presupposes a comparison and therefore an interpretative activity 
by the means o f which something can appear as something. It appears that
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the as-structure  operates, in our case, as a making manifest (Aufzeigung  in 
German and apophansis in Greek), that is to say to show being from itself. 
We had already encountered this problem when dealing with the difference 
between Vorstellung  and B e g riff  between presentation and 
conceptualisation. We had seen that the first level of knowledge did not take 
place in the reconstructive appropriation of a phenom enon, but in the 
realisation of its having to be seen in order for it to show itself as that which 
shows itself from itself. Yet, we have not made clear how much 
conceptualisation relies on presentation, how much, in Heideggerian 
language, a "reference" relies on an "indication": "Every reference is a 
relation, but not every relation is a reference. Every indication is a 
reference, but not every referring is an indicating. This implies at the same 
time that every indication is a relation but not every relation is an 
indicating"  (SZ 78). Heidegger opens a path of thinking along which we 
come to grasping the thing as it shows itself in such or such ontical context. 
An order has to be respected. All that we think we know is knowable because 
it exists under a certain mode o f expression that is indicated by its Being. 
That which the thing shows in its existing is at least itself. We have seen, for 
example with a piece o f equipm ent, that a thing can be more than the 
singularity by which it is characterized as a thing; a thing always travels 
among the field of signification in which it takes a meaning. In that sense, 
and this is that which the thing shows when it is at work in the work o f art, it 
refers to an external elem ent and relates to it. The thing shows itself by 
referring to something, which poses the existence o f a relation  between 
something and something. The thing has "the character o f  the in-order-to".
112
The Question o f Existence
"it is fo r  indicating"  (SZ 78). Because the thing is in relation with something 
else, it stops being the thing that it is in itself from itself; we are dealing 
with a new phenomenon com prising two separate elements. The relating 
therefore leads us away from the initial thing in-order-to  focus on something 
else. A relation implies an agreem ent between two elements which, in the 
scope of this relation, take their value from the validity of the relation. In 
such a conception of the thing, to see it means to see it as that which it 
indicates in order to refer and relate to something else; it is essentially 
equipment. The essential constitution of the as is here herm eneutic, it 
implies a technical activity o f interpretation which parts us from the thing in 
itself.
In the work of art, the thing always refers to the field of possibilities 
belonging to itself and which, because they are only possibilities, are 
concentrated w ithin the thing itself. To perceive the entirety of these 
possibilities rests on the fact that the thing is placed and framed within the 
limits of its own boundaries. The thing that we see is always the thing-at- 
work because only in the work it can be m aintained in its having to be a 
thing. The thing refers to itself and relates to its having to be in the work of 
art. The thing is therefore preserved in the expression o f its Being, that is to 
say in the apophantic perm anence of the work as as-structure. The 
equipm entality o f the thing serves the purpose o f the thing; it refers and 
relates to itself and to itself only. We stand on a revealing circle whose 
essence is descriptively herm eneutic. For Heidegger, to see means to 
understand and, in case o f an apophantic as-structure, to understand that we 
always understand on the mode o f seeing. It is therefore in the expression of
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the to see that understanding can understand itself as such. Only then does it 
fully become itself. In the same way, the work of art understands itself in the 
visualisation of its essential mode of being which is to make see that which 
already shows itself from itself. The German for to understand  is verstehen  
which literally means to “stand ahead”, to stand before. To understand m ust 
then be understood in the sense of projecting oneself w ithin the "there" of 
our preoccupation which is itself defined by the act of projecting itself. By 
projecting itself in its having to be seen, the work of art allows the thing to 
show itself in relation to the whole of the possibilities in which it is 
projected and which constitutes it. To see the thing means to understand it in 
its having to be itself. The thing at work, dwelling in its essence, is always 
an expression of itself in which it sees and understands itself as being the 
thing that it has to be and see. The expression is for the thing the condition 
of possibility to show itself and therefore the condition of possibility for any 
ontological enquiry to take place. There can be an ontology because Being 
shows itself through an expressive medium. Indeed, expression is always an 
ex-pression, an act of drawing out to the light that which, in its essence, 
calls for being drawn out. That which can be expressed always is always a 
phenomenon that can be seen and therefore understood in the light of the 
whole of the world in which it takes its signification. The expression always 
presupposes the possible perception of an understood phenomenon which, 
because it is expressed, is recognized as understood and seen. In other 
words, an ontological analysis o f the to see implies an analysis of its 
condition of possibility which are to be found in Being that offers itself to 
our eyes. To see means to see something that is and the to see understands
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itself as such in itself, that is in the to see. In that respect, the work of art 
travels along its phenom enological path down to the thinking o f Being which 
is to be found in its own mode of existence which is to be given to be seen.
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Conclusion
Together with Heidegger and in the light of the work of art, we have travelled 
along the path of thinking. Reaching Being in its true establishment and sustained mode 
of happening meant for us to re-question the theme of fundamental ontology as it is 
primarily and originally developed in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger’s phenomenology 
remains a constant endeavour to determine the conditions of possibility of an encounter 
with Being revealed in truth. Is it enough to ask the question of Being for it to open 
itself to the considerations of the philosopher ? Indeed, both the Origin o f the Work o f  
Art and Sein und Zeit proved it necessary to access Being in its objectivity as a visible 
phenomenon. And yet, how can it be that what phenomenology describes is the actual 
phenomenality of Being and not our relation to Being ? How should the question of 
Being be asked ? In other words, how can the question itself be self-included within that 
which it targets and, therefore annihilate the distance between itself as a subject and the 
questioned object ? For that reason, we need to find a question that goes beyond all 
entity. As stated in Sein und Zeit, phenomenology is a matter of « wanting-to-have-a- 
conscience » of that which goes <sr without saying ». Being stands as a holding and 
omnipresent energy enabling all things to take their shapes, to be in-formed, and 
therefore to happen. The very presence of our question, of our supposing the possibility 
of the question, remains the indubitable and ineluctable proof of Being’s actuality and 
capacity to receive all things. It is inherent to all that claims a right to expression, the 
steps of a staircase underlying anything that in manifesting itself is given a name and a 
signification. If it stands as the starting point of any thought as a fundamental ground of 
anything that stands, how can the question of Being -or even more so, the work of art- 
pretend to overtake Being in its originality? Being has to remain the core of all things 
lest it be but a mirror of itself which, as it is, is a contradiction. The Origin o f the Work 
o f Art proposes to catch Being red-handed in the process of being, that is in the process
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of withdrawing and resisting to any attempt of unveiling it. To reach Being and to 
define it are in themselves a contradiction, an insult to that which has to remain 
inaccessible for its fundamental nature to be preserved. Being appears both as the 
ground and as the happening expression of things taking place on that ground. To agree 
with this statement comes back to the recognition of a depth between the ground and 
surface of what becomes the Heideggerian phenomenon. This depth does not mean that 
behind the physical phenomenon stands something else but, rather, it induces that the 
appearance of any phenomenon implies the very depth constituting the path along 
which we have travelled. Therefore, the phenomenon does not open itself from and by 
the help of phenomenology but it signifies itself in its own presence, its own thereness 
through the conscious recognition of phenomenology. This was the door that Sein und 
Zeit first located and then entered, and the world that the Origin o f  the Work o f Art 
managed to draw a map of. As a matter of fact, the Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, written in 
1935, brings forth a point of coherence between the two layers of the phenomenon 
entering within itself. This is in no way an insult, a transgression of Being happening in 
truth, but it has to be seen and considered as a come back to things themselves. The 
work of art implies for the spectator a reading which is prompted by the artist who, 
beforehand, opened the doors of the depicted world. From the phenomenon to the world 
it evokes there is but one step. For Heidegger, this transcendental world (transcendental 
in the sense that it overtakes the physical boundaries of the frame) is in no way 
overwhelming the immanence of the phenomenon. Consequently, that which some 
might consider as an insult is in fact that which sets itself at work in the phenomenon. 
Form then on, the piercing through the work of art as a phenomenon is not synonymous 
to moving away from the entity but means its unveiling and understanding in depth to 
catch sight of its Being. The depth therefore constitutes the space of donation of the
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work of art whose presence echoes the world in which it happens. The work of art 
claims its quiddity, its naked thing-being framing a horizon that is at work within its 
work-being. Being at work, it never ceases to commute between its ontical reality and 
the ontological world within which it now echoes itself. The depth of the work of art as 
a phenomenon here reaches a moment of stand still embodied within the incessant 
movement which it itself opens. The work of art manifests itself in the communication 
that it sustains with itself. It pictures itself always claiming to be what it’s not and yet 
what is deep to its core. In that sense, the work of art reveals and unveils the conditions 
of possibility for any phenomenon to be phenomenal, that is to happen and appear. The 
work of art frames the celebration of the moment happening and telling itself in its 
factuality. It frames the interpretation of its own being there, it gives to be seen what 
condition the possibility of being seen, that is to say the phenomenality of the 
phenomenon. The work of art entertains a constant discourse between the things and 
their essential ground and erects itself as the messenger of its being there. The Origin o f  
the Work o f Art comes to be read as an application of Sein und Zeit’s hermeneutics of 
facticity to the work of art which suddenly becomes the word giving itself to be heard, 
the light giving itself to be seen. It is as well a celebration of Aletheia ’s Greek meaning, 
that is to say un-concealment, self-revelation, an epiphany staging its incentive capacity 
to spring into a sublime explosion, the facticity within factuality.
We have then endeavoured in this dissertation to dig further towards the withdrawal of 
Being receding into the darkness of its dwelling. As Wordsworth puts it in Tintern 
Abbey, we have stepped into a presentifying presence whose “dwelling is the light o f  
setting suns”. We have, thanks to the work of art staging Being in the process of being, 
tried to give a name to that which whose identity remains fundamentally anonymous. 
This name essentially became phenomenology, expressing itself as the matrix of any
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possible ontology, of any theory of the object Even though, at first sight, the 
phenomenological method appears to be but a screen filtering our approach to the 
ontological core of the object, we have shown here at length that the very notion of 
screen, or frame, belongs to the conditions of possibility for an object to express itself as 
such, that is to say for an object to be spotted within its objectity. Indeed, we have 
mainly focused in the course of this thesis on Being as a movement in the process of 
happening. The object therefore shows itself because it essentially provides its content 
with the possibility of being perceived as such. It is not only a substantial shape 
standing in the light of a distinct entity, but it constitutes the very apparatus enabling its 
own staging. In that sense we have kept showing how phenomenology emanates from 
the echoing depth residing within the capacity of the object to be one. Heidegger’s 
philosophy remains essentially a philosophy of the non-distance, of the primacy of the 
object being found and understood in its objectity. For that matter we conclude on the 
idea that this method is in itself a formality rather than a science. It is, as it were, an 
“objectology” telling the object as it has always claimed to be. It requires no scientific 
background but merely the acceptation of the object’s objectity and its general 
possibility. With Heidegger, and more particularly with The Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, 
ontology comes to its fundamental ground as objectivity conjuring itself up through its 
ways of being. The existential analytic, as we find it firstly in Sein und Zeit and as it 
then comes to mirror itself in the work of art, therefore proposes a philosophy at the 
service of totality now rendered possible through the finitude of facticity. Although it 
directly engages in the actual capacity for any entity to be, - in  the most usual sense of 
the word- it can yet not follow the path of any ideology. There appears to be no 
militancy or cause that would echo within the world of phenomenological ideas which 
now show themselves as phenomena in the depth of which there is nothing but a factual
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capability and commitment to exist. Heidegger might stand as a guide towards a 
possible encounter with the world in its essence, nevertheless his guidance remains 
spiritual and could in no way be ideological since his philosophy does not prepare the 
ground for the elaboration of an ethical perspective. As already stated in the course of 
our development, things when perceived through phenomenological glasses lose their 
substantiality in order to let forth the happening glow residing within them. Here, the 
reflection and study come to a point of contact with a sphere that would cast a 
transverse light through a universe that I have tried to sense in its totality. Such an 
approach, because with Heidegger it seeks the deep heart’s core of things, also shelters 
within a frame that absorbs and swallows the shout of those questions claiming their 
necessity. It therefore gives birth to a whole series of interrogations -  above all ethical 
and moral interrogations - awakening from their phenomenological sleep. These last 
considerations sprout from Heidegger’s philosophy and show, maybe, that being 
“Heideggerian” might not provide the best tools to understand the spirit and the limits 
of his edifice.
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Conclusion
Together with Heidegger and in the light of the work of art, we have travelled 
along the path of thinking. Reaching Being in its true establishment and sustained mode 
of happening meant for us to re-question the theme of fundamental ontology as it is 
primarily and originally developed in Sein und Zeit. Heidegger’s phenomenology 
remains a constant endeavour to determine the conditions of possibility of an encounter 
with Being revealed in truth. Is it enough to ask the question of Being for it to open 
itself to the considerations of the philosopher ? Indeed, both the Origin o f  the Work o f  
Art and Sein und Zeit proved it necessary to access Being in its objectivity as a visible 
phenomenon. And yet, how can it be that what phenomenology describes is the actual 
phenomenality of Being and not our relation to Being ? How should the question of 
Being be asked ? In other words, how can the question itself be self-included within that 
which it targets and, therefore annihilate the distance between itself as a subject and the 
questioned object ? For that reason, we need to find a question that goes beyond all 
entity. As stated in Sein und Zeit, phenomenology is a matter of « wanting-to-have-a- 
conscience » of that which goes « without saying ». Being stands as a holding and 
omnipresent energy enabling all things to take their shapes, to be in-formed, and 
therefore to happen. The very presence of our question, of our supposing the possibility 
of the question, remains the indubitable and ineluctable proof of Being’s actuality and 
capacity to receive all things. It is inherent to all that claims a right to expression, the 
steps of a staircase underlying anything that in manifesting itself is given a name and a 
signification. If it stands as the starting point of any thought as a fundamental ground of 
anything that stands, how can the question of Being -or even more so, the work of art- 
pretend to overtake Being in its originality? Being has to remain the core of all things 
lest it be but a mirror of itself which, as it is, is a contradiction. The Origin o f  the Work 
o f Art proposes to catch Being red-handed in the process of being, that is in the process
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of withdrawing and resisting to any attempt of unveiling it. To reach Being and to 
define it are in themselves a contradiction, an insult to that which has to remain 
inaccessible for its fundamental nature to be preserved. Being appears both as the 
ground and as the happening expression of things taking place on that ground. To agree 
with this statement comes back to the recognition of a depth between the ground and 
surface of what becomes the Heideggerian phenomenon. This depth does not mean that 
behind the physical phenomenon stands something else but, rather, it induces that the 
appearance of any phenomenon implies the very depth constituting the path along 
which we have travelled. Therefore, the phenomenon does not open itself from and by 
the help of phenomenology but it signifies itself in its own presence, its own thereness 
through the conscious recognition of phenomenology. This was the door that Sein und 
Zeit first located and then entered, and the world that the Origin o f the Work o f  Art 
managed to draw a map of. As a matter of fact, the Origin o f  the Work o f  Art, written in 
1935, brings forth a point of coherence between the two layers of the phenomenon 
entering within itself. This is in no way an insult, a transgression of Being happening in 
truth, but it has to be seen and considered as a come back to things themselves. The 
work of art implies for the spectator a reading which is prompted by the artist who, 
beforehand, opened the doors of the depicted world. From the phenomenon to the world 
it evokes there is but one step. For Heidegger, this transcendental world (tianscendental 
in the sense that it overtakes the physical boundaries of the frame) is in no way 
overwhelming the immanence of the phenomenon. Consequently, that which some 
might consider as an insult is in fact that which sets itself at work in the phenomenon. 
Form then on, the piercing through the work of art as a phenomenon is not synonymous 
to moving away from the entity but means its unveiling and understanding in depth to 
catch sight of its Being. The depth therefore constitutes the space of donation of the
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work of art whose presence echoes the world in which it happens. The work of art 
claims its quiddity, its naked thing-being framing a horizon that is at work within its 
work-being. Being at work, it never ceases to commute between its ontical reality and 
the ontological world within which it now echoes itself. The depth of the work of art as 
a phenomenon here reaches a moment of stand still embodied within the incessant 
movement which it itself opens. The work of art manifests itself in the communication 
that it sustains with itself. It pictures itself always claiming to be what it’s not and yet 
what is deep to its core. In that sense, the work of art reveals and unveils the conditions 
of possibility for any phenomenon to be phenomenal, that is to happen and appear. The 
work of art frames the celebration of the moment happening and telling itself in its 
factuality. It frames the interpretation of its own being there, it gives to be seen what 
condition the possibility of being seen, that is to say the phenomenality of the 
phenomenon. The work of art entertains a constant discourse between the things and 
their essential ground and erects itself as the messenger of its being there. The Origin o f  
the Work o f  Art comes to be read as an application of Sein und Zeit’s hermeneutics of 
facticity to the work of art which suddenly becomes the word giving itself to be heard, 
the light giving itself to be seen. It is as well a celebration o f Aletheia’s Greek meaning, 
that is to say un-concealment, self-revelation, an epiphany staging its incoative capacity 
to spring into a sublime explosion, the facticity within factuality.
We have then endeavoured in this dissertation to dig further towards the withdrawal of 
Being receding into the darkness of its dwelling. As Wordsworth puts it in Tintern 
Abbey, we have stepped into a presentifying presence whose “dwelling is the light o f  
setting suns”. We have, thanks to the work of art staging Being in the process of being, 
tried to give a name to that which whose identity remains fundamentally anonymous. 
This name essentially became phenomenology, expressing itself as the matrix of any
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possible ontology, of any theory of the object. Even though, at first sight, the 
phenomenological method appears to be but a screen filtering our approach to the 
ontological core of the object, we have shown here at length that the very notion of 
screen, or frame, belongs to the conditions of possibility for an object to express itself as 
such, that is to say for an object to be spotted within its objectity. Indeed, we have 
mainly focused in the course of this thesis on Being as a movement in the process of 
happening. The object therefore shows itself because it essentially provides its content 
with the possibility of being perceived as such. It is not only a substantial shape 
standing in the light of a distinct entity, but it constitutes the very apparatus enabling its 
own staging. In that sense we have kept showing how phenomenology emanates fi-om 
the echoing depth residing within the capacity of the object to be one. Heidegger’s 
philosophy remains essentially a philosophy of the non-distance, of the primacy of the 
object being found and understood in its objectity. For that matter we conclude on the 
idea that this method is in itself a formality rather than a science. It is, as it were, an 
“objectology” telling the object as it has always claimed to be. It requires no scientific 
background but merely the acceptation of the object’s objectity and its general 
possibility. With Heidegger, and more particularly with The Origin o f  the Work o f Art, 
ontology comes to its fundamental ground as objectivity conjuring itself up through its 
ways of being. The existential analytic, as we find it firstly in Sein und Zeit and as it 
then comes to mirror itself in the work of art, therefore proposes a philosophy at the 
service of totality now rendered possible through the finitude of facticity. Although it 
directly engages in the actual capacity for any entity to be, -in  the most usual sense of 
the word- it can yet not follow the path of any ideology. There appears to be no 
militancy or cause that would echo within the world of phenomenological ideas which 
now show themselves as phenomena in the depth of which there is nothing but a factual
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capability and commitment to exist. Heidegger might stand as a guide towards a 
possible encounter with the world in its essence, nevertheless his guidance remains 
spiritual and could in no way be ideological since his philosophy does not prepare the 
ground for the elaboration of an ethical perspective. As already stated in the course of 
our development, things when perceived through phenomenological glasses lose their 
substantiality in order to let forth the happening glow residing within them. Here, the 
reflection and study come to a point of contact with a sphere that would cast a 
transverse light through a universe that I have tried to sense in its totality. Such an 
approach, because with Heidegger it seeks the deep heart’s core of things, also shelters 
within a frame that absorbs and swallows the shout of those questions claiming their 
necessity. It therefore gives birth to a whole series of interrogations -  above all ethical 
and moral interrogations - awakening from their phenomenological sleep. These last 
considerations sprout from Heidegger’s philosophy and show, maybe, that being 
“Heideggerian” might not provide the best tools to understand the spirit and the limits 
of his edifice.
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